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Current management theory finds that deeply held values provide a significant 
explanation for the behavior of professionals. Accordingly, this thesis illuminates the 
positive impact that the 1st Special Forces Regiment’s ethical structure—the SF Ethic—
has on the organization’s effectiveness. The study describes the SF Ethic through the lens 
of the two major (opposing) normative ethical theories: consequentialism and non-
consequentialism. It determines that the SF Ethic is a combination of both theories along 
with Virtue Theory. The latter contains the notion of prudence, which offers a balanced 
and deliberative “middle path,” a means by which to navigate a tension that exists 
between the former two theories. The SF Ethic—Effectiveness pathway depicts the 
process by which an SF soldier operating under the SF Ethic might contribute to 
effectiveness. Values shape principles that define one’s duties. Then professional and 
prudential judgment—influenced by organizational and operational factors—informs 
decisions. Essential contextual factors include the environment (often complex and 
unstable), organizational structure (a professional-adhocracy within a machine 
bureaucracy), and culture. Organizational theory concepts—commitment, trust, and 
professionalism—empirically evince the SF Ethic—SF Effectiveness correlation. 
Likewise, Army and SF publications offer trust-based explanations—related to 
legitimacy and influence—for the SF Ethic—SF Effectiveness link. Recommendations 
include organizing the various conceptions of values and attributes to provide a sense of 
hierarchy, priority, and common definitions across sources; developing a semi-
algorithmic process guide to help operators systematically think through moral dilemmas; 
and adding an ethics training block to the SF Qualification Course to professionalize the 
force and contribute to organizational effectiveness.   
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I. ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is no such thing as a philosophy-free [organization]; there is only an 
organization whose philosophical baggage is taken on-board without 
examination.  
—Daniel Dennett1 
ADRP 1 The Army Profession exhorts military leaders to discover the truth: 
“Situational understanding requires [us]…to discern what is actually so, the truth.”2 
When we consider it in the broadest terms, the first SOF Imperative, “Understand the 
operational environment,” echoes this idea. The truths this thesis seeks to illuminate are 
under-explored cultural factors related to values and ethics that help explain why 
members of the SF organization do what they do and how those actions influence the 
organization’s effectiveness. 
Professor of management Jennifer Palthe notes that “practitioners need to ask 
themselves the question: how often do practices in organizations merely continue to exist, 
not because of their effectiveness, but due to organizational inertia?”3 This question is 
what this thesis attempts to answer with respect to organizational ethics. As Palthe 
suggests, “Since institutional structures are highly resistant to change, for change to 
occur, the taken-for-granted quality [institutional structures] must be brought into 
question,” and researchers “must first explore that which holds members of the 
                                                 
1 This is a play on Daniel Dennett’s original line, “There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; 
there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on-board without examination,” taken from 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 1995. I replaced the word “science” with “organization” and used this modified 
quote to support the contention that it is vital for organizations to assess their own philosophical 
underpinnings, since principles and norms largely flow from them.   
2 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1 The Army Profession 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2015), 2–8. 
3 Jennifer Palthe, “Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements of Organizations: Implications for 
Managing Change,” in Management and Organizational Studies 1, no. 2 (May 2014): 63. 
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organization to their old sets of actions.”4 Such knowledge will be vital to those seeking 
to assess the SF organization or affect institutional change. 
In recent management research (2017), organizational theorists April Wright, 
Raymond Zammuto, and Peter Liesch conclude that “deeply held values” provide a better 
explanation of the actions of professionals than the previous (and ubiquitous) power and 
ego-based explanations.5 Accordingly, this thesis uses organizational theory to assess the 
empirical and logical connections between ethics and organizational effectiveness, both 
broadly, and for Special Forces in particular. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. I first discuss the research questions and 
the theory that underpins the subsequent chapters. Chapter II describes the Special Forces 
ethical framework—the SF Ethic. Chapter III turns to organizational theory to describe 
the organization’s environment, structures, and culture that serve as the medium in which 
the SF Ethic operates. Here, I also consider factors that link ethics and effectiveness at 
the individual level of analysis: commitment, trust, and professionalism. Chapter IV then 
considers the details of what effectiveness means for SF and analyzes what Army and SF 
publications say about the ethics-effectiveness link. Finally, Chapter IV uses the 
illustration of the SF “soldier statesman,” made famous by President John F. Kennedy, to 
show how a professional might navigate the tension between realism and idealism or 
consequentialism and deontology (defined below) in a way that makes SF both trusted 
and effective. I conclude with final thoughts and recommendations in Chapter V.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to answer two complementary research questions, one related to 
normative moral philosophy and one related to organizational theory. The purpose of the 
first question is to illuminate the normative underpinnings of the SF Ethic. The purpose 
                                                 
4 Palthe, “Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements of Organizations,” 63. 
5 April Wright, Raymond Zammuto, and Peter Liesch, “Maintaining the Values of a Profession: 
Institutional Work and Moral Emotions in the Emergency Department,” in Academy of Management 
Journal, 60, no. 1 (February 2017): 230.  
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of the second question is to understand the real-world implications and effects of the SF 
Ethic on the SF Regiment.  
1. The SF Ethic: Consequentialist or Non-consequentialist 
The said truth is that it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that 
is the measure of right and wrong. 
— Jeremy Bentham6 
Live your life as though your every act were to become a universal law. 
— Immanuel Kant7 
As previously mentioned, the first research question, which aims to provide a 
description of the SF Ethic using normative moral philosophy asks:  
“Is the moral framework that underpins the organizational ethics and values in 
the Special Forces Regiment more consequentialist or deontological?” 
The purpose of describing Special Forces ethics and values using this dichotomy 
is twofold. First, deontology and consequentialism represent the two dominant (opposing) 
theories in moral analytical philosophy that assess our choices. Second, a rich scholarly 
body of work is available on both consequentialism (including utilitarianism) and 
deontology. The two theories have undergone rigorous examination both in principle 
(normative ethics), and in application (applied ethics). Moreover, the implications of each 
these moral theories have been well developed. While this dichotomy is far from 
exhaustive and is perhaps oversimplified, it can still provide useful insights about the 
normative perceptions in Special Forces that inform decision making. As we shall see, 
decision making, in practice, is a more complex process.  
By consequentialist, I broadly mean that the Special Forces culture, norms, and 
command guidance seem to prefer weighing the possible ends when considering what 
                                                 
6 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1775). A paradigmatic 
quote to exemplify consequentialism and contrast with non-consequentialism. 
7 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). A paradigmatic quotes to 
exemplify non-consequentialism and contrast with consequentialism. 
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actions are morally permissible. Consequentialism is the moral philosophy that the 
rightness of an act is based largely or entirely on its consequences. That is, “the rightness 
or wrongness of an act is determined by the… results [or expected results] that flow from 
it.”8 An objectively right act is one in which, “it is reasonable to expect that it will have 
the best consequences.”9 To use the old colloquialism, in consequentialism, “the ends 
justify the means.” 
In utilitarianism (a form of consequentialism) the right act is simply the one that 
achieves “the greatest [aggregate happiness] for the greatest number.”10 There is no 
“lesser evil” when deciding between two apparently bad options, because the action that 
results in the best overall consequences is the objectively right action. As such, no “moral 
residue” or so-called “dirty hands” exist for an action that causes harm while bringing 
about the “greater good.”  That is because the greater good is, according to utilitarianism, 
the only good; alternative options would be, in fact, wrong to pursue.  
For John Stuart Mill, who followed Jeremy Bentham as a founder of 
utilitarianism, an important moral principle integral to utilitarianism was that, “A person 
may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he 
is justly accountable to them for the injury.”11 Thus, for Mill, a person is morally 
culpable for his actions (commissions) just as much as his inactions (omissions). This 
utilitarian consideration is important to note because intuition might suggest that (a) 
taking a deliberate action that causes harm—in the interest of reducing aggregate harm—
is more blameworthy than (b) taking no action, even if the results in greater harm than 
had we acted. Stated another way, one might feel less culpable for (a) failing to act when 
                                                 
8 Louis Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1995), 110. 
Philosophers Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick are best known for founding and 
developing consequentialism and utilitarianism. For explanations of these normative moral theories, see 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by Jeremy Bentham (1775), Utilitarianism by 
John Stuart Mill (1861), and The Methods of Ethics by Henry Sidgwick (1907). For a summation of these 
theories with discussion, see Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, by Louis Pojman (1995), Chapter 6. 
9 Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 119.  
10 Ibid., 109. 
11 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1869), I.11. 
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he could have prevented greater harm than he would for (b) acting in ways that cause 
harm but reduce aggregate harm. Mill rejected this notion.  
Accordingly, for SF operators to advocate and act upon the idea that either action 
or inaction (in pursuit of the aggregate greater good) share equal merit would suggest that 
the SF Ethic is utilitarian in nature. Likewise, if it becomes apparent that members of the 
SF organization are more open to acts that commit or risk harm in pursuit of the 
aggregate greater good—acts that others might shy from as unpalatable—from this we 
might infer a more consequentialist ethic is at work.  
Similarly, Henry Sidgwick, who followed Bentham and Mill in the utilitarian 
tradition, found it to be a self-evident principle that, “the good of any one individual is of 
no more importance, from the point of view of the universe, than the good of any 
other.”12 From this principle, Sidgwick felt we might naturally infer that each person “is 
morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own.”13 Such a 
consideration (either implicitly or explicitly) for the intrinsic equality of worth of 
persons, when deliberating one’s actions—e.g., instances of sacrificing the good of the 
few for the good of the many—can serve as another possible indicator of utilitarian 
underpinnings.  
In contrast, by deontological, I broadly mean that the Regimental culture, norms, 
and command guidance seem to prefer establishing certain actions as duties irrespective 
of the outcome. Note that I use the terms non-consequentialist and deontological 
synonymously throughout this thesis. In deontology, contra consequentialism, the ends 
do not justify means. In fact, the ends should not be the primary driver in determining 
right actions. Rather, the principles and intent behind the action are the dominant moral 
determinations, on this view.  
Broadly speaking, non-consequentialist normative theories are those that hold, 
simply, that the consequences are not all that matter when we make our moral 
                                                 
12 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1907), 382. 
13 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 382. 
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deliberations. Or, put differently, that there are non-consequentialist reasons and 
principles that should have significant weight, sometimes even decisive weight, in our 
moral decision making. There are a range of deontological theories. One of the most 
well-known is Immanuel Kant’s approach.14    
According to Kant’s categorical imperative, one should do what is right for its 
own sake, precisely because it is right, and not because it gives you a better life, for 
example. Kant considers the “good will,” that is, the intention to do what is right for its 
own sake, to be the one intrinsic good. That is to say, according to Kant’s deontology, 
intentions matter morally rather than the results or consequences for any given action. 
Moral norms are without exception, but are necessarily and categorically true.  
Kant posited several formulations of the categorical imperative, the first of which 
is, “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law.”15 This first formulation serves as criterion for judging 
other imperatives and maxims. According to Kant, we should act in a way that we could 
(being logically consistent) want the principle upon which we are acting to become a 
universal law. We cannot act in such a way that we contradict ourselves. Thus, principles 
must be universally applicable, or they are self-defeating. In his third formulation, Kant 
contends that we can know what is right through our use of reason. When we act in 
violation of principles established by reason, we contradict ourselves.  
Additionally, Kant believed humans, as moral agents, have intrinsic value and 
worth and, thus, cannot be used as mere means to some particular end since humans are 
what he calls “ends in themselves.” This principle is based in Kant’s second formulation 
of the categorical imperative known as the principle of ends, in which he states, “So act 
as to treat humanity, whether your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an 
                                                 
14 For a detailed explanation of Kantian deontology, see Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
by Immanuel Kant, (1785). For a summation of deontological theories with discussion, see Ethics: 
Discovering Right and Wrong, by Louis Pojman (1995), Chapter 7.  
15 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), ed. Allen W. Wood (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 37.  
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end and never merely as a means.”16 What follows from this principle of ends is the 
intrinsic value of individual autonomy or self-direction, which is found in Kant’s third 
formulation of the categorical imperative.17 In sum, where the SF Ethic prohibits using 
others as mere means, assigns unimpeachable value to individual persons, or focuses on 
duties rather than ends, it is indicative of deontological normative underpinnings.  
As one might expect, a study of the SF Ethic reveals that it contains both 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist components. Accordingly, a real tension 
between these two opposing normative schools of thought emerges. This tension—
between two different ways of determining to the right action—is a major source of 
ethical dilemmas and potential ambivalence that SF operators face. 
The SF Ethic also contains attributes of a third major ethical theory: Virtue 
Theory. Within Virtue Theory, the notion of prudence shows promise in helping bridge 
the consequentialist-non-consequentialist divide (discussed in Chapter IV). Virtue Theory 
is founded in aretaic thought and focuses on being a good person rather than on “the right 
thing to do” or the results.18 It emphasizes one’s character or what one should be rather 
than what a person should do. In virtue theory, the goal of life is living well. Thus, where 
deontology might be considered negative proscription in many ways, virtue ethics are 
more positive or prescriptive, in a general sense. One should do that which is part of a 
good life including finding a balance and moderation in all, which is what Aristotle calls 
the Doctrine of the Mean.19  
Virtue then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative 
to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason 
by reference to which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean 
between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.20 
                                                 
16 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 47. 
17 Ibid., 49–52. 
18 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd Ed., ed. Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1999). Book II discusses “Virtue of Character.” (18–30) Book VI, “Virtues of Thought,” discusses 
knowledge, prudence, understanding, wisdom, deliberation, and comprehension (86–99). 
19 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 338. 
20 Ibid., 25. 
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For virtue theoretical approaches, happiness or flourishing is the main end; its 
method is virtue; and for one to be happy, one must be moral. 
Worth mentioning is ethical relativism or within it moral subjectivism, given (a) 
their ubiquity in public discourse and (b) my purpose of identifying objective normative 
principles in the SF Regiment. For this thesis, I assume moral realism and reject moral 
relativism, as the latter fails to provide (logically prohibits) any means to discuss right 
and wrong, by its own definition. Moral relativism also results in absurd entailments 
including the non-existence of moral progress or reform, the denigration of others’ truth 
claims, and the consequence that we could never condemn even the “worst” actions—say 
torturing children for fun—if another person felt his actions were permissible. “Right” 
and “wrong” would simply be matters of opinion.21 But, there are objectively better ways 
to live, and we can use normative ethics to prescribe them.  
Accordingly, the SF ethical framework that prescribes behavior (and the reasons 
for such behavior) is based on principles that the organization implicitly accepts as (either 
epistemically or ontologically) objectively true.22 While several other moral approaches 
exist and likely have an influence in the SF moral framework, such outliers fall outside 
the scope of this research. I have omitted such discussion in favor of brevity and 
simplicity, I believe, without losing much in the way of explanatory power.   
                                                 
21 Relativism asserts that no objective moral truth exists. Thus, the correct attitude is tolerance for 
differing opinions. However, this “attitude” essentially makes a universal moral claim that we should not 
make universal moral claims. Thus, it is internally contradictory, incoherent, and self-defeating. Also, 
(despite the common misconception) the conclusion that objective morals do not exist does not follow from 
premise that persistent moral disagreement exists. As James Rachels observes, “There is no reason to think 
that if there is moral truth everyone must know it” (The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Chapter 2, New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 15–29, 1999). That opinions on morality differ is simply descriptive. 
22 Philosopher Jeffery J. Lowder provides an explanation of the distinction between ontological and 
epistemological moral objectivity. The former refers to “the order of being,” the latter, “the order of 
knowing.” In the former case one might claim ‘murder is wrong’ because there is a real property, 
wrongness, even if no one thought murder was wrong. In the latter case, one might claim murder is 
objectively wrong because an Ideal Observer when contemplating the act of murder, has feelings of 
disapproval. Louis Pojman expands on the idea of an “Ideal Desirer,” that is, “a person who is impartial and 
has maximal knowledge of the consequences of all actions. What the Ideal Desirer would choose would be 
by definition the ‘good,’ and what he or she would disdain would be the ‘bad.’” (Ethics, 1995) Lowder 
asserts that many if not most contemporary philosophers writing on meta-ethics endorse one of two form of 
objective morality. Taken from “Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane 
Craig.” Due to its pre-publication status, it is only available in video form: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yH5B5UZvuhw. 
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2. The Impact of the SF Ethic on Effectiveness  
Since the above moral frameworks represent diverging approaches to determining 
what is good or evil, it would make little sense to judge the good or evil that results from 
one moral framework or the other. Such an effort would be circular since each of these 
frameworks defines what we mean by good or evil. Thus, to avoid begging the question, I 
explore how the extant Regimental moral framework influences organizational 
effectiveness by drawing on organization theory. Accordingly, the second question asks: 
In what ways does the SF moral framework increase or decrease—that is, 
positively or negatively impact—the SF Regiment’s organizational effectiveness?23  
While organizational theory includes a number of conceptions of effectiveness, 
many overlap. The McShane-Von Glinow “Team Effectiveness Model” contains five 
effectiveness criteria: (1) “achieve of organizational goals,” (2) “satisfaction of member 
needs,” (3) “team growth and learning,” (4) “team survival,” and (5) “satisfaction of 
outside stakeholder needs.”24 Similar in some regards, Daft defines effectiveness in terms 
of four approaches: (1) “resource based,” (2) “internal processes,” (3) “stakeholders,” and 
(4) “goals.”25  
For simplicity and utility, I restrict my definition of effectiveness to Daft’s 
“internal processes” and “goals” as well as the three Hill-McCaskey criteria for 
effectiveness: (1) “performance,” (2) “member well-being and development” and, (3) 
“shared capacity to adapt and learn.”26 Daft’s “internal processes” have important 
implications for ethics and culture, incentives, and decision-making. As Daft notes, 
                                                 
23 The following discussion of organizational effectiveness applies likewise to (and holds true for) 
teams and groups, given that groups and teams are small organizations, and organizations are groups of 
groups (or teams of teams). This is noteworthy given the importance of teams and groups in SOF.  
24 Steven McShane and Mary Ann Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill 
Irwin, 2007). 
25 Richard Daft, Organization Theory and Design (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Pub, 
2010), 57. 
26 McCaskey model. 
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“among ‘internal processes’ the greatest significance is attached to culture”—the latter 
contains the organization’s values and ethics.27  
By his goals approach, Daft means, “the degree to which an organization achieves 
its goals,” where “goals” refers to the goals that “satisfy the purpose of the organization’s 
existence.”28 This I take to mean the Regiment’s ability to perform its strategic and 
operational (irregular warfare) purposes and tasks as described in Special Operations 
doctrine and covered in detail in Chapter IV. Thus, Daft’s goals approach aligns with the 
first criterion from both McShane-Von Glinow and Hill-McCaskey models. I exclude 
“resource based” and “stakeholder” approaches, which would introduce many conflicting 
conceptions of effectiveness.  
A key assertion in this research is that the ethical behavior of members of the SF 
Regiment correlates with higher levels of organizational effectiveness: 
 
Acting ethically  p(organizational effectiveness) 
 
Accordingly, this thesis provides qualitative argument in support of the idea that 
ethical behavior positively correlates with organizational effectiveness, both as a 
generalizable principle and also applied to the case of the Special Forces Regiment. I 
argue that qualitative evidence shows this to be true and that its truth is accepted in U.S. 
Army and SOF doctrine. 
Having defined effectiveness in organizational theory terms, I now summarize the 
organizational theory and Army/SF doctrinal reasons why acting ethically might lead to 
organizational effectiveness. That is, I give an overview of the various conceptions of the 
SF Ethic-effectiveness link. Organizational theory and Army/SF publications have many 
overlapping definitions and descriptions; I note them as they appear.  
                                                 
27 Krum Krumov, Knud Larsen, and Plama Hristova, “Organizational management and organizational 
effectiveness,” in Advances in Psychology: Research Approaches, Kassel University Press, 2013, 307. 
28 Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 22. 
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In organizational theory terms, culture, commitment, trust, and professionalism all 
seem to link ethics and effectiveness, given the SF environment and organizational 
structure. Chapter III defines these factors and describes how they serve as mechanisms 
that connect ethics and effectiveness in SF.  
In terms of Army and SOF publications, the SF Ethic-effectiveness link seems 
most clearly conceived as mediated by internal and external trust, a bifurcation found in 
ADRP 1.29 Likewise, USASOC considers trust vital for solving what it considers the 
“fundamental” irregular warfare problem: expanding physical, cognitive, and moral 
access.30 This internal-external trust bifurcation appears again within the “moral access” 
tenet in which perceived legitimacy is related to external trust and strong negotiating 
position is related to internal trust.  
Thus, I divide the trust-mediated ethic-effectiveness link into (1) reputation or 
perceived legitimacy considerations (external trust) and (2) relational influence or rapport 
considerations (internal trust). I consider reputation and relational influence factors 
distinct from both “acting ethically” and from “organizational effectiveness” and as a 
mediating mechanism by which the former influences the latter. By way of preserving 
and building trust, the SF Ethic improves effectiveness.  
Acting ethically  p(trust)  p(effectiveness) 
Acting ethically  p(trust)  p(expanding access)  p(effectiveness) 
Acting ethically  p(trust)  p(good reputation)  p(effectiveness) 
Acting ethically  p(trust)  p(relational influence)  p(effectiveness) 
The torture of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers at Abu Graib provides a stark 
illustration of these trust-based effects. When news of the abuses became known, the 
immediate result (in addition to violence and reprisals) was a loss of U.S. legitimacy, 
influence, and access to partner forces and to the indigenous population.31 U.S. 
                                                 
29 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 3–1, 3–2. 
30 U.S. Dept. of Defense, USASOC Planner’s Handbook v2.0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, September 2014), V-17. 
31 Thomas Friedman, “Restoring Our Honor.” New York Times, May 6, 2004. 
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cooperation with Muslims worldwide suffered, and insurgent networks presumably 
received additional financial and recruiting support.32 Likewise, U.S. commanders may 
have reconsidered the levels of autonomy they granted their troops due to trust concerns, 
perhaps increasing micromanagement.  
All this is not to say that ethical failings necessarily entail military defeat. Despite 
Abu Graib, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was defeated. Military operations sometimes succeed 
despite ethical failures. However, this fact does not imply that ethical failures have no 
impact on effectiveness. The evidence herein presented suggests the opposite is true. 
Effectiveness—both in terms of internal processes and goals or purposes—seems to be 
hindered by moral failings, even if not catastrophically in this case.  
At this point, one might suppose this thesis is implying that ethical behavior (or 
perhaps that ethical idealism) is a panacea. However, in practice, pragmatic concerns and 
dilemmas abound such as apparent conflicts between ethical behavior and mission 
accomplishment. Often these dilemmas align with the (previously mentioned) tension 
that exists within the SF Ethic between consequentialism and non-consequentialism. I 
argue that the notion of prudence offers a way to navigate that tension that may optimize 
effectiveness.33 Prudence, in its aretaic sense, is the means toward achieving the virtuous 
end.34 It deals with “…adjusting or applying the universal moral virtues to particular 
situations,” or alternatively conceived, “steering a middle path…between the amorality of 
realists and the excessive moralism of idealists.”35 As an important component of the  
ethic-effectiveness link, I discuss the idea of prudence in detail in Chapter IV.  
I chose to evaluate the impact of the Regiment’s ethical framework on 
organizational effectiveness, rather than say, the framework’s impact on the family lives 
                                                 
32 Thom Shanker, “Abu Ghraib Called Incubator for Terrorists,” New York Times, February 14, 2006. 
33 The idea that prudence might offer an effectual “middle path” between consequentialism and non-
consequentialism is based on International Politics professors Alberto Coll and Richard Shultz’s contention 
that prudence can offer a middle path between political realism and idealism. 
34 Alberto Coll and Richard Shultz, “Can American Democracy Employ Covert Action as an 
Instrument of Statecraft?” in International Law Studies 67: Legal and Moral Constraints of Low-Intensity 
Conflict, Newport: Naval War College, 1995, 340. 
35  Coll et al., Legal and Moral Constraints of Low-Intensity Conflict, 340.  
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of the organization’s members, because the overall effectiveness of Special Forces 
seemed to be most pertinent both to commanders and civilian leaders, my target 
audience.36 Thus, this study attempts to answer the vital question of how the Regiment’s 
moral framework influences its ability to fulfill its assigned role. 
A framework for understanding the process by which Ethics influences 
Effectiveness in this thesis is reflected in Figure 1. This framework depicts a simplified 
linear model that aims to illustrate several important relationships between elements and 
variables of both moral philosophy and organizational theory. This model synthesizes 
philosopher Louis Pojman’s “Schema of the Moral Processes” (which largely makes up 
the horizontal axis) with organizational theory factors (mostly in the vertical axis).37 
Values, such as life, autonomy, and mastery exist in their own right. The 
normative ethical framework (consequentialist, non-consequentialist, or virtue ethic) 
helps to shape values into principles that define our general duties (such as to promote 
human flourishing). Next, judgment is applying the correct principle for the situation—
defined by the organizational considerations, using prudence. Once a decision is reached, 
willpower (one’s ability to overcome acrasia) will result in prudent action.38 The sum of 
an organization’s prudent actions results in organizational effectiveness. Each of these 
elements listed in Figure 1 receives its own treatment in subsequent sections of the thesis. 
                                                 
36 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Field Manual (FM) 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 2001), 1–9. 
37 Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, the “Schema of the Moral Process,” 94. 
38 Acrasia refers to knowing the moral good but doing evil, lacking of self-control or self-discipline, or 
acting against one’s better judgment through weakness of will. Aristotle largely ascribes willpower to 
education and training by habituation (ethismos) until one acquires the right habits (ethos). (Aristotle, 19–
20) Similarly, virtue “requires training and rational control of one’s feelings and capacities by prudence.” 
(Aristotle, 324, 338) In The Power of Habit (2014), Pulitzer prize winner Charles Duhigg lends empirical 
support to Aristotle’s emphasis on habituation, describing the science of habit formation. Dr. Kelly 
McGonigal in The Willpower Instinct (2011) identifies several additional empirical (psychological and 
physiological) factors that correlate with improved or diminished willpower.  
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Figure 1.  The Impact of the SF Ethic on Organizational Effectiveness.39 
C. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS  
Having discussed the two complementary research question and their integration 
in Figure 1, this section reviews a variety of important background theories that will be 
used to frame and analyze ideas presented in the subsequent chapters. This section 
concludes with a philosophical discussion of organizational change in SF before moving 
on to the SF ethical framework—the SF Ethic in Chapter II. 
                                                 
39 Adapted from Louis Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, the “Schema of the Moral 
Process,” 94 and Organizational Design theory concepts. 
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1. Qualitative Analysis and Reductionism 
The transition from ethics to effectiveness is a shift from philosophy to social 
science. As organizational theorist, John B. Miner avers, “To the extent that increased 
organizational effectiveness is desired, science becomes a means to this goal.”40 
Accordingly, this thesis attempts to connect ethical abstractions with the achievement of 
concrete SF goals such as the unit’s effective performance of its irregular warfare tasks. 
As described by Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco, but applied here to SF, I 
want to develop and use schemata to better “understand how such non-physical things as 
purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions, theories, intentions, and values can play a part 
in bringing about physical changes in the physical world.”41 An example is the model in 
Figure 1, which emerged from inductive analysis of normative ethics and organizational 
theory in combination.   
This thesis attempts to achieve a degree of “exactness,” not through measurably 
predicting future events or through mathematical language, but by “constructing a 
theoretical system of idealized models containing abstract constructs of variables and of 
relations between variables, from which most propositions concerning particular 
connections can be deduced.”42 To use the social science “clocks and clouds” analogy, 
this research is largely cloud-like.43 That is, I provide several models to envision the 
process being described that exclude numerous interactive variables from the complex 
system. I leave it to the reader to decide to what extent the models I have developed 
possess “real” or “instrumental” truth. At a minimum, I hope to provide good evidence 
for the latter.  
To further ensure my claims are proportioned to the evidence, I do not suggest 
that the schemata presented in this thesis will have the power to predict individual 
                                                 
40 John Miner, Organizational Behavior 4: From Theory to Practice (New York: Sharpe, 2007), 4.  
41 Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco, “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,” in World Politics 
29, no. 4 (July, 1977): 491. 
42 Fritz Machlup, “Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?” Readings in the Philosophy of Social 
Science, (Cambridge: MIT, 1994), 11. 
43 Almond et al., “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,” 489–522. 
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interactions. As Miner asserts, “We know a great deal about the factors that influence 
peoples work performance, but we do not know enough about the interaction of these 
factors in specific instances to predict with a high degree of accuracy exactly how well a 
certain individual will do in a particular position.”44 Accordingly, I aspire to provide 
explanatory and probabilistic predictive power at the mezzo and macro (group and 
organization) levels. 
This is not to imply that the individual level of analysis factors discussed in the 
Chapter III do not impact effectiveness. Rather, I mean that these schemata may have 
probabilistic predictive power when applied broadly, to groups or organizations rather 
than to specific individuals. Accordingly, we might say that, as part of a holistic effort, an 
SF leader could gain insights from the concepts presented in this thesis when formulating 
a plan to make his organization effective. I consider the conclusions and models herein 
well supported, but more empirical testing is needed, particularly within the Regiment. 
Such testing would serve to confirm the applicability of these concepts and the degree of 
their impact—compared to and in combination with other significant variables. 
However, my goal here—rather than to design or engineer a better organization, is 
simply to explain, that is, to reverse engineer the structures and processes at work in the 
SF organization. I will leave it to those who follow to consider the implications of the 
schemata I describe and to address the re-design or re-engineering question. 
2. Structural Contingency Theory 
The models I employ include the organization’s general and task environment as 
well as structures and processes that have a bearing on this research question. 
Specifically, I try to adduce particular qualitative connections between ethical 
organizational culture and effectiveness in the SF Regiment and then organize them in a 
coherent and useful way. In doing so I distinguish between (a) what SF operators 
consider the “right” thing to do, and (b) why they actually do what they do. 
                                                 
44 Miner, Organizational Behavior 4: From Theory to Practice, “On the Nature of Theory,” 3. 
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Many interdependent variables impact organizational effectiveness; ethical 
structure is only one. However, through mostly qualitative analysis I attempt to show that 
certain ethical structures do seem to have relationships with the degree of effectiveness 
within organizations, particularly in the case of the SF Regiment’s structure. I argue in 
Chapter III that the Special Forces Regiment (at least at the company level and below) is 
best described as a hybrid adhocracy-professional bureaucracy, as defined by Henry 
Mintzberg.45  
It has been noted also that each SF Group has its own unique culture. This being 
the case, I accept that my description of the Regiment is generalized and thus accepts 
some error. However, I also think that Special Warfare magazine, SF doctrine, and other 
SOF publications taken as a whole largely do the work of generalizing the culture.  
3. Institutional Theory 
Like Structural Contingency Theory, Institutional Theory provides a well-
established macro-level framework for social behavior. Several terms that overlap with 
those of institutional theory emerge in Chapter III. Thus, describing this theory will 
hopefully assist the reader with conceptualizing and categorizing ideas that I present. 
Institutional Theory is composed of three pillars: regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive. Attributes of each pillar are listed in Table 1. These pillars provide 
meaning and stability in social life and might be thought of as what members have to do, 
ought to do, and want to do, respectively.46 The regulative pillar includes policy, work 
rules, army and unit regulations, and law, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) as bases of legitimacy.  
Values, which “involve acting in the interests of others,” represent the normative 
pillar.47 The normative pillar is the primary focus of this research as it emphasizes moral 
                                                 
45 Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  
Prentice Hall, 1993. 
46 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 201. 
47 Ibid., 204. 
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bases of legitimacy and includes procedures, norms, social obligations, duties, and 
defines what means are legitimate in pursuit of valued ends.48 As members exhibit 
institutional values in their everyday work, they maintain the institution or drive 
change.49 The cognitive pillar represents legitimacy from a shared mindset, interpretation, 
mental model, or conceptual belief. 
Table 1.   Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Institutional Pillars.50 
 
 
There is a dearth of empirical research that demonstrates the degree to which the 
three “pillars” are interdependent or if one or two of them are best conceived of as 
operating within the frame of a third.51 Given this ambiguity, my conceptualization of the 
process does not contradict current organizational theory but provides a new multi-
disciplinary analytical framework that I hope offers additional insight.  
What has been established is that organizational explanations “cannot simply be 
pared down to the relationships between independent and dependent variables,” but 
“should be viewed as interactions between context and action.”52 Zilber (2002) suggests, 
“scholars should take into account the processual and dynamic nature of an 
organization’s institutional elements and the interplay between institutional actions, 
                                                 
48 Palthe, “Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements of Organizations,” 61. 
49 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 204. Appendix B details this process. 
50 Source: Palthe, “Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements of Organizations,” 63.  
51 Ibid., 64. 
52 Ibid. 
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meanings, and actors.”53 The interplay between pillars in practice is “dynamic and 
complex.”54 For these reasons, I explore themes from both normative and cognitive 
pillars to describe how SF ethics impacts effectiveness.  
4. A Meta-philosophy of Improvement 
How might the Regiment improve from an analysis of its moral framework? 
Hegelian philosophy suggests that, metaphysically, a dialectic process is continually at 
work in which each generational zeitgeist is displaced by a new and antithetical zeitgeist, 
and these are synthesized with (and retain) the best aspects of each.55 For Hegel, this 
metaphysical construct would increasingly approach perfection.56  
If there were some truth to this Hegelian metaphysical construct, and if we 
assumed organizations like the 1st Special Forces Regiment are in relevant respects 
analogous to the societies Hegel described, a normative dialectic within the organization 
might have the potential to reframe the organization’s cohering “spirit,” thereby affecting 
organizational improvement.  
It seems likely that the normative paradigm has shifted since the Regiment’s 
inception. Thus, it would also seem sensible for SF leaders to carefully (and regularly) 
interrogate the current paradigm and thought regimes to retain some and expel others. To 
assume that our current paradigm is optimal is to ignore the history of change and to be 
nihilistically cynical of the notion of progress.  
                                                 
53 Palthe, “Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements of Organizations,” 64. 
54 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 234. 
55 Hegel’s dialectic process is described in detail at: Maybee, Julie E., “Hegel’s Dialectics,” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/hegel-dialectics/. 
56 I selected military historian David Glantz’s conception of the Hegelian dialectic process because it 
seems to provide an adroit metaphor for understanding the process by which SF might improve as an 
organization. Glantz describes the process as a sort of Gouldian punctuated equilibrium in which the “idea” 
or “spirit” of the times evolves in discrete stages. (From “The Red Mask: The nature and legacy of Soviet 
military deception in the Second World War,” in Intelligence and National Security, 2008, 254.) This 
conception of discrete, dynamic organizational change seems to align with Gen. Stanley McCrystal’s 
description of cultural shifts in U.S. special operations that often correspond with significant events, such 
as the 1980 Desert One fiasco (Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement in a Complex World, 2015.)  
 20
From a pragmatic or political realist sense, it follows that we should understand 
how our moral structure is impacting our performance and modify it to be more effective, 
if for nothing more than to win our nation’s conflicts and to increase our national power 
by making the SF Regiment a more honed instrument. But, beyond pragmatic concerns, I 
hope that discussion of the SF Ethic framed in Utilitarian, Kantian, and Aretaic terms, 
illuminate the intrinsic—rather than simply instrumental—importance of objective moral 
values and thus the objective importance of being deliberate about our moral culture. 
I am under no illusions that this thesis will catalyze such a change of spirit within 
the Regiment. However, it is plausible that codifying the nature of the organization, by 
illuminating the normative structure that exists, and through dialectic, perhaps senior 
leaders can make judgments about new directions to might restructure the Regimental 
“zeitgeist.” Discussions of the normative philosophy of the organization should be part of 
such a dialectic. 
Since  the  process  of  ordering  is  a  defining  characteristic  of civilization and 
social  life, the specific forms it takes are consequential, particularly with regard to the 
manner in which they mediate between order and chaos. How we think about right and 
wrong, behaviors and even ways of thought that are circumscribed or framed in a certain 
way have everything to do with the type of solutions that we develop. If this thesis can 
expose to light a certain portion of that way of organization thought—the moral sphere—
it can contribute to our meta-thinking and allow us to be more deliberate. Essentially, we 
can understand and thus affect our philosophy, or we can simply hope that our 
underpinnings are sound.  
 
Chapter I introduced the idea of synthesizing moral philosophy and organizational 
theory to ascertain the extent to which the SF Ethic impacts the SF Regiment’s 
effectiveness. I proposed two complementary research questions, the first designed to 
analyze the nature of the SF Ethic. Here, I described two opposing normative theories: 
consequentialism and deontology, as well as the aretaic notion of prudence. The second 
research question was designed to ascertain the impact of the SF Ethic. I thus described 
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effectiveness and proposed some important mediating mechanisms by which the SF Ethic 
impacts effectiveness. I concluded Chapter I by offering a linear model (Figure 1) to 
describe the process, as well as a description of the theoretical underpinnings on which 
this research relies. Chapter II will now describe in detail the SF Ethic, noting the 
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II. THE SPECIAL FORCES ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
My fondest dream was to return home, and I didn’t care at all for the idea 
of dying in a prison camp; however, prisoner or not, I was still a soldier 
bound by my code. I was stripped of all material assets, leaving only the 
intangibles which form the core of our existence: faith, ethics, morals, 
beliefs. 
— Col. James N. Rowe, 197157 
Chapter II describes the Special Forces ethical framework—the SF Ethic. It 
includes both exogenous factors that influence SF and endogenous factors that SF 
publications either enumerate or imply. Exogenous factors include societal values, the 
law of armed conflict, and the Army Ethic. Endogenous factors that relate to the SF Ethic 
include the Human Domain, SF lineage, history, and values, as well as various individual 
and unit characteristics, traits, and attributes. The latter are divided into two sections—
one consequentialist, the other deontological.  
A. EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
The Special Forces ethical framework lies within the context of the philosophical 
heritage and traditions of our society, the Army, and the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC). These include U.S. founding documents (such as the Declaration 
of Independence), the Just War tradition, universal norms, the golden rule, and various 
Army codifications of values including the Army Values, Soldier’s Creed, the Warrior 
Ethos, and mottos such as Duty, Honor, Country. 
                                                 
57 James N. Rowe, Five Years to Freedom (New York: Ballantine, 1971), 119, 232. In his 
autobiography, legendary Special Forces officer, Colonel “Nick” Rowe, describes his survival in and 
escape from an enemy prison camp during the Vietnam War. Having discovered as a POW that the 
Uniform Code of Military Conduct was impractical, he authored the Code of Conduct still used by all 
branches of the U.S. Armed Forces. It is the basis for POW behavior taught at the U.S. Army Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School, which he also designed.  
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1. Societal Values 
As a nation, we respect “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” as “self-
evident truths.”58 According to philosopher Louis Pojman, we would call these truths 
values that exist in their own right.59 Pojman gives the following examples of values: 
“life, loving relationships, freedom, privacy, happiness, creative activity, knowledge, 
health, integrity, and rationality.”60 Values inform our principles. For example, from the 
intrinsic value integrity, we would derive the principle of being honest. Likewise, the 
fundamental rights of the American people to national independence and sovereignty are 
principles derived from the above “self-evident truths.” These principles are also the 
moral basis for the Army mission and thus foundational to the SF Ethic.61 Based on those 
rights, the Army exists to preserve the peace and to win the Nation’s wars in accordance 
with Title 10 of the United States Code.62 That is why we serve.  
Furthermore, the SF Regiment, both explicitly and implicitly, uses exogenous 
ethical factors in describing its own ethical norms, as will become apparent. For example, 
the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) “Alpha Committee,” which designs and 
implements qualification training for future SF unit commanders, explicitly relies on 
ethics training grounded in documents external to SF doctrine, such as those mentioned 
above.63 Thus, in formulating the SF Ethic, we will consider the exogenous influences on 
the SF Ethic before analyzing the endogenous ones.  
                                                 
58 Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776; ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 
2–2. 
59 Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 93. 
60 Ibid. 
61 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 3–4. 
62 Ibid., 2–9. 
63 CPT Michael DiPietro. Alpha Committee, SFQC, October 10, 2017. 
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2. Law of Armed Conflict  
The law of war or law of armed conflict (LOAC) is one such exogenous source.64 
The SF Ethic operates within the context of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Just 
War Theory (JWT). The LOAC is defined as “the part of international law that regulates 
the resort to armed force; the conduct of hostilities, and the protection of war victims; 
belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral and non-
belligerent states.”65 Since the focus of this thesis is the normative (rather than 
regulative) institutional pillar, I focus on the aspects of the LOAC that influence SF 
norms, that is, on the underlying normative principles.  
According to the “Alpha Committee,” the SFQC teaches ethics based on Field 
Manual (FM) 27–10: the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2015).66 The 
“Alpha Committee” follows directives found in FM 3–05 Army Special 
Operations that, “Commanders at all levels ensure their soldiers operate in 
accordance with the law of war” as described in FM 27–10.67 This Law of War 
Manual is the codification of the U.S. view of the LOAC, and it has similar counterparts 
internationally. At the normative level, the LOAC appeals to the principles of heritage, 
duty, and the consequences of following the LOAC. 
In the case of heritage, FM 27–10 describes the LOAC as representative of “who 
we are,” citing George Washington and Abraham Lincoln as enforcers of a code of 
conduct during (Jus in bello) warfare.68 Thus, the LOAC has an aretaic grounding in the 
sense that what we do is important because it defines us as virtuous (or not).  
                                                 
64 For an in depth treatment of LOAC applied to Special Forces, see Law and Morality at War by Adil 
Ahmad Haque (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
65 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Field Manual (FM) 27–10 Law of War Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, June, 2015), 7. 
66 CPT Michael DiPietro. Alpha Committee, SFQC, October 10, 2017.  
67 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Field Manual (FM) 3–05 Army Special Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, January, 2014), v.  
68 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 27–10 Law of War Manual, ii. 
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Next, FM 27–10 appeals to duty in a Kantian sense, implicitly emphasizing 
deontology and grounding morality in reason. FM 27–10 says, “obeying it [LOAC] is the 
right thing to do”—an implicit appeal to non-consequentialist objective morality. 
Likewise, the FM cites the post-World War II tribunals in which Justice Robert Jackson 
describes the “voluntary submission of captive enemies to the judgment of law” as “one 
of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”69 Here, Justice 
Jackson implicitly recognizes the (Kantian) grounding of morality in reason. 
Finally, the FM emphasizes the desirable ends produced by following the LOAC, 
appealing to practical concerns. Rather than an obstacle, the LOAC is designed to be 
consistent with the requirements of winning in war. Specifically, FM 27–10 cites 
complying with the LOAC as, “the same good order and discipline necessary to operate 
cohesively and victoriously in battle.”70 The FM also describes torture and unnecessary 
destruction as counterproductive. These factors are consequentialist in nature.  
The normative principles upon which the LOAC is grounded, according to FM 
27–10 are military necessity, humanity, and honor. These are the basis for and entail 
further principles such as proportionality, distinction (discrimination), and avoidance of 
unnecessary suffering.71 Thus, we can say that the former three principles are likewise 
fundamental components of the SF Ethic.  
The first, military necessity, implies that military units including SF are morally 
obligated and justified in using, “all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and 
efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”72 The military necessity 
principle is vital for the way SF operators conduct war using imagination and creativity in 
their methods. This ends-related clause seems consequentialist. However, military 
necessity includes “broader imperatives” than apply to any particular situation and will 
fall within the discussion of prudence in Chapter IV.  
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While military necessity is permissive or justificatory, the principle of humanity is 
restrictive, that is, it forbids the commission of unnecessary “suffering, injury, or 
destruction.”73 The norm here is the protection of human life and prosperity, which is, in 
turn based on the notion that humans are intrinsically valuable. Thus, when operating 
adaptively and creatively under the principle of military necessity, the SF Ethic dictates 
that operators keep in mind the value of people as ends in themselves.  
Lastly, honor in LOAC relates to the avoidance of perfidy and the treatment of 
certain classes of persons.74 Particularly relevant to SF is the prohibition against 
“compelling nationals of a hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed 
against their own country.”75 To behave honorably, the SF Ethic thus prohibits Green 
Berets who are conducting unconventional warfare from compelling indigenous forces to 
fight. Again, this principle relates to the intrinsic value and respect of persons, including 
valuing their autonomy and self-determination. Thus, honor here seems deontological. 
From the above principles the U.S. Army has derived, “The Soldier’s Rules” (Figure 2), 
which likewise seem mostly non-consequentialist in nature.  
 
Figure 2.  The Soldier’s Rules.76 
                                                 
73 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 27–10 Law of War Manual, 58. 
74 Ibid., 67. Perfidy includes dishonorable conduct that appeals to the enemy’s humanity—such as 
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for fundamental objective moral principles.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–0 Operations 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 2016), 3–13. ADRP 3–0 states, “The 
Soldier’s Rules in AR 350–1 distill the essence of the law of war...and all soldiers should follow them.” 
 28
3. The Army Ethic 
ADRP 1 states that the minimum standard for ethical conduct is the UCMJ, 
regulations, and policies. Command authorized “exceptions to policy” can help mitigate 
the tension between policies and special operations tasks that are more effectively done in 
unconventional ways. However, given that the regulative institutional pillar is largely 
outside the focus of this research, I focus on ethical components. As many have noted, 
what is legal is not necessarily moral, and what is moral is not necessarily legal. This 
research then, within the normative institutional pillar, focusses on what is moral to SF.   
According to ADRP 1, the professional Army Ethic is, “the evolving set of laws, 
values, and beliefs, embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivates and guides 
the conduct of Army professionals bound together in a common moral purpose…to do 
the right thing for the right reason in the right way.”77 From this strong doctrinal claim 
regarding intentions and “right reasons,” one can immediately see that a purely 
consequentialist approach is excluded from the moral decision-making process of 
soldiers, including SF members, even if the door to some consequentialist reasoning 
remains ajar. Furthermore, the Army Ethic recognizes the “intrinsic dignity and worth of 
all people, treating them with respect,” a strikingly clear non-consequentialist values 
statement.78 
However, the Army Ethic also defines “what is right” as what is “ethical, 
effective, and efficient.”79  In this way, the ADRP defines moral action as synonymous 
with “effective” and “efficient.” Both of these terms are clearly ends-related and thus 
consequentialist.  
One lives the Ethic by being an honorable member, by demonstrating “character, 
competence, and commitment,” and by following the seven Army Values captured with 
the acronym LDRSHIP: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and 
                                                 
77 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 1–1, 1–2. 
78 Ibid., 2–6. 
79 Ibid., 2–29. 
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personal courage.80 FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations articulates that the Army 
Values “form the basis for standards of conduct for the whole force.”81 Thus, the SF 
Regiment itself affirms that the Army Values are SF values, and the Army Values lean 
heavily on non-consequentialism. 
ADRP 1 proposes a moral thought process as follows. “Situational understanding 
requires our individual and collective wisdom and judgment…to discern what is actually 
so—the truth. With shared understanding we...decide what is right.”82 This moral 
epistemology implies objective morals exist and that they are based in reason, as Kant 
argues at length.83 In “situations of uncertainty…Army professionals base their decisions 
on the principles of the Army Ethic, ensuring protection of the inalienable rights of all 
people.”84 This emphasis on people as ends-in-themselves further suggests a non-
consequentialist normative framework at play.  
B. ENDOGENOUS FACTORS 
What makes Special Forces different? Character and maturity; they can be 
counted on to do the right thing each and every time. They are reliable and 
dependable. 
— MG Sidney Shachnow, CDR U.S. Army SF CMD85 
Having considered the exogenous factors related to the SF Ethic, which seem to 
be predominantly, though not exclusively, non-consequentialist in nature, we now turn to 
endogenous aspects of the SF Ethic. These aspects include the Human Domain, SF 
lineage and values, as well as individual and unit characteristics, traits, and attributes.  
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1. Humans Are More Important than Hardware86 
The Special Forces motto De Oppresso Liber—To Free the Oppressed serves as 
both moral compass and moral justification for the SF mission. In deontological fashion, 
it implicitly recognizes the value of human life and the intrinsic importance of promoting 
human flourishing. Moral theory has everything to do with the flourishing of human 
beings, and human concerns dominate the language of SOF culture.87  
This verbiage suggests that the SF culture recognizes both the intrinsic 
importance and extrinsic practicability of valuing and respecting people. ARSOF 2022 
uses the word “human” or “people” 38 times (on average, more than a mention per 
page).88 Similarly, “human” or “people” appears 28 times in ARSOF 2022 Part II, 50 
times in ARSOF Next, and 36 times in USASOC 2035.89 In SF, “Humans are more 
important than hardware,” is the first SOF Truth because it is the most important one.   
The top priority in ARSOF 2022 is “invest in human capital.”90 The Regiment 
emphasizes the principle of taking care of its people in tangible ways, providing physical 
and mental health services and programs including THOR3 (fitness), Strong Bonds 
(marriage), Operator Resiliency (family support), and Unit Ministry (religious). These all 
serve to “preserve the force and its families” through physical, psychological, spiritual, 
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and familial-social programs.91 Additionally, the Regiment recognizes the importance of 
developing individuals through education, training, and unique broadening experiences.92 
This emphasis on the “health of our force” suggests that the SF Ethic includes a 
fundamental respect for the value of people.   
Likewise, in combat, SF soldiers are willing to risk the lives of the many for the 
lives of the one or the few, abiding by the commitment to “never leave a fallen 
comrade.”93 This thought process explicitly rejects any utilitarian calculations and is thus 
a deontological norm. Accordingly, the Ranger Creed normatively aligns with a 
prominently displayed plaque at the 75th Ranger Regiment: 
Not for fame or reward  
Not for place or for rank  
Not lured by ambition  
Or goaded by necessity  
But in simple  
Obedience to duty94 
The second highest ARSOF priority, “optimize interdependence” (among U.S. 
conventional forces and interagency partners) also emphasizes people and relationships.95 
“A successful outcome of Special Forces as an instrument of national strategy depends on 
unified action in all phases.”96 Likewise, SF emphasis on foreign language and cultural 
training implies a regard for understanding the concerns of others, that is, empathy. Thus, 
the human-centric internal policies and communications described above, as well as the 
emphasis on objective duties in combat, are all suggestive of deontological norms. 
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2. The Human Domain and Engagement 
However, not only do human concerns appear within how SF treats and 
communicates with its own people, the SF Regiment and the Army as a whole recognize 
the strategic importance of the Human Domain, which “encompasses the totality of the 
physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior.”97 In a shift 
from an enemy-centric focus to a population-centric one, TRADOC PAM 525–8–5 
describes a future environment in terms of the social, political, and economic concerns 
rather than by describing enemy actions. Current doctrine now describes the Human 
Domain and Land Domain as representing two opposite ends of the spectrum of military 
operations.98 Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno noted, “Conflict is a human 
endeavor, ultimately won or lost in the Human Domain.”99 Accordingly, the Army 
considers the Human Domain a critical (or possibly the most critical) aspect of the future 
operating environment. 
Like the Army at large, SOCOM has placed its emphasis for the coming decade 
on the Human Domain, even though it has long been an ARSOF core competency and 
area of expertise.100 LTG Cleveland cites the Human Domain as a contested battle space 
that is key to success in war.101 Similarly, flag officers Amos, McRaven, and Odierno, 
have stated that “the ‘Human Domain’ [is] the key determining factor in future 
conflicts.”102 Specifically, they have stated that, “the success of future strategic initiatives 
and the ability of the U.S. to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment will 
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rest more and more on our ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the 
Human Domain.”103 These leaders “expect the influence of the human domain to 
[continue to] grow” in its importance to national security.104 As it does, the fact that 
morality has to do with deciding human concerns gives us reason to expect that the 
importance of moral discourse will grow commensurately with the importance of the 
Human Domain. 
Typifying the recognition among Army leaders of the strategic importance of the 
Human Domain is the introduction of the seventh warfighting function: engagement.105 
Engagement is “the Army’s most holistic effort to understand the tremendous influence 
of the human factors of the operational environment. Its intent is to institutionalize...the 
capabilities to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a 
culturally attuned manner...to assess, shape, deter and influence foreign security 
environments.”106 All this institutional emphasis on human concerns implies that the 
culture within these organizations has a non-consequentialist Kantian quality.  
The Army doctrinal term engagement is related to the SF term special warfare, 
which is “that form of special operations in which the United States government defends 
its interests through training, material or even direct combat support to indigenous people 
and friendly governments whose interests coincide with those of the United States.”107 
Accordingly, “SOF are uniquely assessed, selected, trained, educated and equipped to 
affect and influence human behavior to enhance stability or fight and defeat 
adversaries.”108 To the extent that SF uses others as mere means, SF demonstrates 
                                                 
103 Hoffman, “Generals: ‘Human Domain’ Will Dictate Future Wars.” 
104 Ibid. 
105 ADRP 3–0 Operations, 4–3. The Army’s seven warfighting functions (also known as “elements of 
combat power”) are now mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, 
protection, and engagement. “Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using 
[the final two “elements of combat power”] leadership and information.” 
106 U.S. Dept. of Defense, TRADOC Pamphlet (PAM) 525–8–5 U.S. Army Functional Concept for 
Engagement (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2014), iii. 
107 USASOC, “ARSOF 2022,” 12. Emphasis mine.  
108 USASOC, “ARSOF 2022 Part II,” 6. 
 34
consequentialism. However, if interests align, neither partner is using the other as a mere 
means and the Ethic remains deontological.  
According to SOCOM, “The Human Domain is about developing understanding 
of, and nurturing influence among critical populaces.”109 As part of “nurturing 
influence,” empathy and respect for persons emerges as a “core competency,” that has 
both (a) intrinsic value—as captured in the SF motto, De Oppresso Liber—To Free the 
Oppressed and (b) instrumental value in “winning population-centric conflicts”—as 
articulated in command guidance. Thus, human concerns, including those of the Human 
Domain, are a persistently vital factor for SOF. In fact, the Human Domain and 
Engagement represent a Strategic Center of Gravity in which “humanity reinforces 
military effectiveness.”110  
In navigating human concerns, SOF doctrine emphasizes projecting competence, 
persuasiveness, setting the example, and compromise. While persuasion techniques and 
compromise may seem to imply consequentialism, according to doctrine, SOF must 
never compromise on force security or human rights issues.111 Thus, setting the example 
and the lack of compromise on protecting its own people (security) and protecting others 
(human rights) imply that doctrine prioritizes non-consequentialism. Overall, as a core 
value, SF culture explicitly recognizes both the intrinsic and instrumental worth of people 
within its own ranks, in other U.S. forces and agencies, and in its partners abroad.  
3. A Return to First Principles 
ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles is dedicated largely to the idea that the 
organization’s lineage is an explicit source of its principles, values, and identity. LTG 
Cleveland notes that “U.S. Army special operations units [have] brought great honor to  
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the nation, the Army and our profession by their remarkable service during World War II 
and the numerous conflicts that followed.”112 Accordingly, ARSOF Next suggests, “The 
future is written in our past,” and that “ARSOF warriors...operate much in the same way 
their forbearers did, holding fast to the legacy that has been passed down to them.”113 
Next asserts that “historic first principles...have stood the test of time...and continue to 
shape [the Regiment] today.”114 
According to LTG Cleveland, ARSOF Next refocuses “on what is most important 
to ARSOF: our people.” It also focuses on “universal truths of the ARSOF Soldier, units, 
and our promise to the nation.”115 Thus, ARSOF Next is a particularly useful source as it 
specifically addresses principles and values, “characteristics of ARSOF units,” and “the 
collective attributes of individuals.”116 It addresses questions like, “Why does ARSOF 
fight? Why do ARSOF warriors do the things they do, believe what they believe and have 
such a unique commitment to the nation?”117  
LTG Cleveland suggests that ARSOF principles “are deeply ingrained in the traits 
of the ARSOF Soldier, the characteristics of an ARSOF Unit, and our Promise to the 
Nation.”118 Thus, we can derive ARSOF principles from a review of these traits, 
characteristics, and Promise. Figure 3 consolidates the ARSOF 5 Truths, 10 Imperatives, 
4 Unit Characteristics, 3 Soldier Traits, and the Promise to the Nation.119  
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Figure 3.  ARSOF Principles.120 
4. The Characteristics of the ARSOF Unit  
The four “characteristics of the ARSOF unit”—adaptability, autonomy, empathy, 
and expertise (Figure 3)—are “shared values” according to ARSOF Next.121 These 
“characteristics” are synonymous with “esprit d’corps” and “corporate culture” in the 
business world. The characteristics encompass “the unit culture reflected in the behavior 
or its people and the meaning people attach to it.”122 Given this thesis’ acceptance of 
ADRP 1’s contention that culture and ethic are integrated (argued in further detail in 
Chapter III), these characteristics should weigh heavily in a description of the SF Ethic. 
ARSOF describes adaptability as “the most important trait” and the “one inherent, 
critical characteristic that grows increasingly more important.”123 Adaptability is the 
units’ ability to respond quickly “to strategic and operational change,” and “to rapidly 
change from one mission, theater, or core task...based on the changing operating 
environment.”124 Here, ARSOF Next describes adaptability as changing quickly between 
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tasks rather than as adapting one’s principles to ambiguous ethical situations. That is to 
say, adaptability here is not described in terms of moral flexibility. Thus, this description 
does not provide strong evidence of a consequentialist ethic. It is uncertain, of course, 
whether absence of evidence for consequentialism here can be considered evidence of 
absence. However, adaptability appears again in the “ARSOF [individual] attributes” 
(below), there with consequentialist implications. 
ARSOF Next describes autonomy as “decentralized...independent” and 
“empowered to act with disciplined initiative within prudent boundaries.”125 In SOF, it is 
“accomplishing the mission with just your wits and the commander’s intent.”126 ARSOF 
Next cites the Alamo Scouts during WWII who operated in small, independent teams and 
conducted 106 missions, collecting 44 Silver Star Medals, all without losing a man.127 
The intrinsic value of autonomy is found largely in deontological normative ethics. 
Likewise, the expectation that rational actors should do the right thing, unsupervised, 
further reflects non-consequentialist thought. Thus, the SOF characteristic of autonomy 
serves as inductive evidence for a deontological SF Ethic.  
The SOF characteristic empathy immediately brings to mind an intrinsic respect 
for persons, a deontological consideration. This seems to be the case in terms of the SF 
Ethic, and it aligns with the SF motto De Oppresso Liber. ARSOF Next calls empathy 
“intuitive identification with the thoughts, attitudes, feelings and ideas of others—both 
friendly and enemy.” However, ARSOF Next couches empathy, at least in part, in 
consequentialist terms. Empathy, for SOF is, at least in part, adhering to the first SOF 
Imperative: “understanding the [physical, intellectual, political, or social] operational 
environment.” According to ARSOF Next, with respect to empathy, “Every decision 
[ARSOF units] make and every resource they expend is done in consideration of the 
impact on overall mission accomplishment.” The ARSOF Operating Concept states, 
“ARSOF are central to the tasks of first understanding the human domain and then 
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shaping it in accordance with U.S. objectives.”128 These statements, especially with 
respect for the purpose of empathy and the focus on the human domain, are 
consequentialist. They suggest SOF units exhibit empathy for instrumental reasons. 
Accomplishing other purposes, such as National Security Strategy goals and directives 
are the real goal—rather than the real objective being the recognition of the intrinsic 
worth of persons.   
In response, one might argue that these instrumental purposes can coincide with 
intrinsic purposes and thus are not exclusively consequentialist. Or we could say that SF 
is respecting the intrinsic worth of persons by providing them with effective (national) 
security. Regardless, we seem to be implying that, at least to an extent, the ends justify 
the means. As American revolutionary Nathan Hale professed, “Every kind of service 
necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary.”129 This is clear and 
unambiguous consequentialist thinking.  
The historical example of empathy ARSOF Next provides shows the possible 
confluence of intrinsic respect for persons and ends-focused mission accomplishment but 
does little to illuminate to which side the SF Ethic falls. Through truthful, resonant 
messaging, SOF elements convinced a third of the Lord’s Resistance Army under Joseph 
Kony to defect and cease committing atrocities against central African citizens.130 
However, this example fails to address how SOF soldiers should respond when the means 
and the ends are at odds, when the choice seems to be between one or the other, which we 
might presume is more typical than not. Thus, in the case of empathy, ARSOF Next seems 
ambivalent about whether decision making in the SF Ethic is consequentialist or not. 
We might consider here the example Kant provides of a shopkeeper who refrains 
from overcharging a child. If he refrains because it is the right thing to do, the shopkeeper 
possesses the good will and is doing right. But if he refrains simply to stay in the good 
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graces of other customers who are watching, he has failed to do good, even though the 
end result was the same. In the latter case, he lacked the good will. Kant says, “It is not 
sufficient to do that which should be morally good that it conform with the law; it must 
be done for the sake of the law.”131 Likewise, if SF soldiers exhibit empathy simply for 
the purpose of other ends, it is hard to see how we could consider their actions non-
consequentialist.  
However, if Green Berets do what they believe is good, for its own sake, they are 
behaving in a non-consequentialist manner. An example might be Sergeant First Class 
Jerry “Mad Dog” Shriver, a Vietnam-era Green Beret who cared little for medals (despite 
his many decorations). What Shriver cared about were the Montagnard tribesmen, “who 
were his comrades-in-arms.”132 ARSOF Next notes that Shriver “spent all of his money 
on them, even collecting food and clothes to distribute in the Montagnard villages... [and] 
living in the Montagnard barracks.”133 While few Green Berets may spend their own 
money on their partner force, the example of SFC Jerry Shriver demonstrates that using a 
partner force does not entail consequentialism. Like Shriver, Green Berets do not see 
others as mere means to an end. “Irregular warfare...is ultimately about the choices of 
individuals and the future that they desire.”134 This conclusion seems to implicitly accept 
the objective importance of recognizing personal autonomy or self-determination in 
others, a conspicuous non-consequentialist view. 
USASOC 2035 notes, “to the Afghan Special Forces the U.S. Special Forces 
passed on some of their most important lessons: how to think strategically; how to 
negotiate complex challenges; and how to engage the population and build trust.”135 In 
the words of a SF soldier, “We work together, train together, eat together, and we spend 
time together. When we go into the field and shed blood—we do it together.”136 If a 
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Green Beret is willing to shed his own blood with a partner force in the pursuit of 
common objectives, it would be hard to defend the notion that the SF soldier is using his 
partner as a mere means. The existence of a bond of trust implies that both sides share 
mutual respect; literally, they possess the good will, in the classic Kantian sense.  
The last SOF unit characteristic, expertise, could be said to be deontological in the 
sense captured in the film Good Will Hunting. That is, “we cannot universalize a maxim 
to refrain from developing our talents” because of its degenerative effects on a society (if 
everyone were to refrain from developing his or her talents).137 Or stated another way, 
Kant says, “To neglect…predispositions to greater perfection…would at most be able to 
subsist with the preservation of humanity as end in itself, but not with the furthering of 
this end.”138 Thus, when SF units work to achieve high standards of expertise, they are 
acting in accord with the Kantian categorical imperative. 
5. ARSOF SF Individual Attributes and Traits 
According to ARSOF Next, “a review of...selection and assessment criteria” (here 
this thesis enjoys the benefit of previous relevant studies) revealed eight common 
ARSOF soldier “attributes”: professionalism, adaptability, integrity, perseverance, team 
player, operational aptitude (capability), personal responsibility, and courage (Figure 
4).139 ARSOF Next explains that “the combination of these [eight] attributes within each 
individual develops the common ethos and manifests itself in three common overarching 
‘traits’: toughness, audacity, and love.”140 These three traits “describe the essence of 
ARSOF” and are a “common ethos,” what “makes ARSOF, ARSOF.” They summarize 
the individual identity and “core values” of SF soldiers “as warriors.”141  
                                                 
137 Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 142. 
138 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 48. 
139 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
140 Ibid. Emphasis mine.  
141 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35; U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 1–
18. Ethos, a Greek word, is often translated as “habits,” or “disposition.” 
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Figure 4.  ARSOF / SF Individual Core Attributes.142 
In addition to ARSOF Next, Special Forces officer training at the U.S. Army John 
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) provides a unique 
source of quantifiable data about the attributes that the SF Regiment values, in the form 
of weighted criteria used to evaluate SF officers. These criteria are specified in the 
“Individual Student Assessment Plan” (ISAP). To complete the Special Forces Officer 
Course, students must receive a specified minimum score, aggregated from three 
categories (weight indicated below by %): knowledge, skills, and attributes.143  
Knowledge evaluation (20%) uses three written exams, a project, and a paper to 
measure SF doctrinal knowledge and communication ability. Skills evaluation (40%) 
grades the student in one or two leadership positions to observe him putting into practice 
five equally weighted criteria: skills, application, influence, judgment, and character. The 
                                                 
142 Source: U. S. Army, “ARSOF Core Attributes,” U.S. Army Special Operations Center of 
Excellence, http://www.soc.mil/swcs/about.html. 
143 USAJFKSWCS memorandum, “Individual Student Assessment Plan (ISAP) for Special Forces 
Officer Course (18A),” June, 2017. 
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first four are largely self-explanatory. Character refers to the student’s ability to 
demonstrate the SF attributes. SF attributes evaluation (40%) is based on two peer and 
instructor reviews of the individual. It equally weighs the same eight SF attributes 
mentioned above: professionalism, adaptability, integrity, perseverance, team player, 
operational aptitude (capability), personal responsibility, and courage. 
Likely some overlap exists between knowledge and attributes, and significant 
overlap seems to exist between skills and attributes. Thus, we can say the eight SF 
attributes capture a significant portion of what the Regiment values in its members, and 
thus the attributes (Figure 4) describe a big portion of the SF Ethic. A competitor for 
market share of the SF Ethic might be the SF Core Values (Figure 5), but, as we shall see, 
much of those values is either explicitly or implicitly is related to the SF Core Attributes. 
Therefore, if we assume that the Regiment rewards what it values, we can say that the 
attributes make up the lion’s share of the SF Ethic because (1) the attributes represent 
what the Regiment actually uses to assess its soldiers, and (2) the attributes have 
significant overlap with other sources of SF values and ethics.  
Also, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has established broad 
Special Operator competencies to serve as the basis for component (subordinate) units 
(such as the USAJFKSWCS) to use to set their own specific measures of “training, 
education, experience, and proficiency” for specific operator career profiles.144 
USSOCOM calls these competencies “knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs).”145 These 
competencies are captured in the Special Operator Competency Model (SOCM) (Figure 
6). The USAJFKSWCS evaluation criteria are derived in part from the SOCM. 
Particularly, the SOCM helps define, for the schoolhouse, some of the SF Core 
Attributes.146 In discussing each of the attributes, the SOCM descriptions provide 
additional clarity.  
                                                 
144 USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model,” January, 2014, D-2. 
145 USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model,” D-2. 
146 Discussion with CPT Mike DiPietro on October 10, 2017. CPT DiPietro is a member of the 18A 
Committee, which oversees the design and implementation of training for all Special Forces officers in the 
SF Qualification Course (SFQC) before they serve as commanders of SF detachments and above. 
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Figure 5.  SF Core Values.147 
The SOCM (Figure 6) breaks down these competencies into three categories 
(from broad principles to specific technical proficiencies): (1) operator attributes, (2) 
enduring competencies, and (3) targeted competencies. Elements of the SF Ethic are 
specified or implied in (1) and (2), while elements of the SF Ethic are necessary to 
accomplish (3) for reasons based in relational influence and reputation factors mentioned 
in Chapter I. The operator attributes (1) are further subdivided into the categories of 
intellect, character, and commitment.  
                                                 
147 Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 1–19. 
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Figure 6.  Special Operator Competency Model.148 
In Figure 7, I have consolidated seven SOF values models (for lack of a better 
word) and assigned their respective terms to categories into which they seem to fall: 
consequentialist, non-consequentialist, prudential, other, or neutral.149 This (Figure 7) 
categorization aligns with the three “most important” ARSOF individual traits (as rated 
by ARSOF soldiers): adaptability (consequentialist), professionalism (prudential), and 
integrity (non-consequentialist).  
                                                 
148 Source: USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model,” D-2. 
149 No formal (doctrine or memorandum) synthesis of these exists, to my knowledge. 
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Figure 7.  Consolidated Values, Principles, and Attributes 
The adaptability-professionalism-integrity “triad” is noteworthy because a major 
finding of this thesis is that professionalism (which is related to prudence and judgment 
as defined in this thesis) seems to be of use in resolving an apparent tension between 
adaptability and integrity (Figure 4). Once we compare their respective compositions, we 
might likewise say a parallel tension (and consequentialist-non-consequentialist 
dichotomy) exists between intellect and character (Figure 6) and audacity and love 
(Figure 3). This “tension” manifests itself most clearly when dilemmas arise: situations in 
which the overriding applicable principle and thus the solution are unclear.  
In some situations there is a law which students will use to guide their 
decisions. Some of the other [decisions] are more grey, usually leading to 
a good discussion, which rarely identifies the “right” answer.150 
When SF soldiers find themselves making “grey area” decisions in morally 
ambiguous situations, “the right answer” as “more often the least bad decision,” that is, 
the lesser of two evils.151 Ethical dilemmas students (or operators) might see include: 
 
                                                 
150 Discussion with CPT Mike DiPietro on October 10, 2017. 
151 Ibid.  
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- mistreatment of enemy prisoners by a partner force in a FID environment 
- insider threat in a FID environment 
- war crimes by a guerilla force commander 
- the opportunity to misuse OPFUND due to poor planning or money mismanagement  
- black market dealings (e.g., to procure weapons) 
- working with a double agent 
- meeting a leader of a violent extremist organization to negotiate the release of captives 
- hiring locals to find and/or dispose of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)152 
 
Each of these situational dilemmas (bulleted above) contains both 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist considerations. As we have seen above, 
operators are expected to skillfully use their creativity and character—with adaptability 
and integrity—to determine a solution and then take action. What is not immediately 
clear is how one should balance or prioritize these seemingly conflicting factors.  
C. THE NORMATIVE COMPONENTS OF THE SF ETHIC 
Having considered the relevant normative models and enumerated the SF values, 
principles, and attributes, we will now discuss them in more detail. The following 
sections will cover the attributes or terms by their respective categories (Figure 7): 
consequentialist, non-consequentialist, prudential, other, or neutral. Chapter II then 
concludes with a final discussion of the nature of the SF Ethic, some of its implications 
for organizational effectiveness, and recommendations. 
1. Consequentialism 
What follows is a discussion of the ARSOF terms that seem to largely align with 
consequentialism. Adaptability emerges as “the most important” ARSOF unit trait 
(Figure 3), one of the top three “most important individual attributes (Figure 4) and as a 
SOCM attribute (Figure 6). The adaptable SF soldier “adjusts thinking and actions to fit a 
changing environment; creates innovative solutions to complex problems.”153 The two SF 
Values, innovation and versatility are components of adaptability; the latter is defined as 
                                                 
152 ODAs in Afghanistan recruited, trained and employed a Civil Mine Reduction Group (CMRG) 
force to counter insurgent IED tactics. 
153 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
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“adapting quickly.” To the USAJFKSWCS, excellence in adaptability includes 
modifying “demeanor, posture, or word choice to fit any situation; able to work by, with, 
and through diverse cultures; a superb problem solver...applies lessons learned to shape 
his environment...gets a desired outcome.”154 The SF Attribute perseverance (Figure 4) 
likewise is defined as “working toward an end.”  
In the SOCM, adaptability is an attribute that falls under intellect—along with 
creativity, resourcefulness, cleverness, and initiative (all roughly aligned with 
consequentialism). Intellect is “the capacity to acquire and understand knowledge, and 
then exploit that knowledge and understanding creatively in new situations.”155 This is 
similar to intelligent, meaning “thinks and solves problems in unconventional and 
creative ways...rational and logical—not emotional.”156 Creativity is described as, 
“thinking inside/outside established conventions or models to generate innovative 
approaches.” Resourcefulness includes “imaginative leveraging” of “ideas, networks, and 
materials to deal with ambiguity.” Cleverness includes being “ingenious” in “acquiring 
and applying new knowledge.” Last, initiative is, “creating and exploiting opportunities 
by taking appropriate risks to achieve a desired outcome.”157  
To conclude the consequentialist-leaning terms, the overarching individual trait 
audacity is described as making “bold decisions that no one else will make because they 
are too hazardous, too ambitious, too controversial, or too unconventional... [but] never 
reckless.”158 A daring hostage rescue is proffered as an example.  
Finally, according to the USASOC Planner’s Handbook, “consensus building 
often takes the form of ‘power politics.’” The handbook asserts that the staff planner 
“should pay respects to the potential Machiavellian side of consensus-building 
                                                 
154 http://www.soc.mil/swcs/about.html. Emphasis mine. 
155 USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model,” D-3. 
156 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. Intelligence was replaced after 2015 with Personal Responsibility 
in the ARSOF Individual Attributes.  
157 USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model,” D-3. Emphasis mine. 
158 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 40. Emphasis mine. 
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strategies.”159 These include pruning (excluding) influential potential dissenters to build 
a “façade of consensus;” destroying the credibility of dissenters; political exchange (quid 
pro quo); sidetracking potential dissenters; flattery; co-opting, threat (superior to 
subordinate); intentional ambiguity; and misinforming. In the last case, “This tactic is 
viewed by the liar as a necessary evil, in order to achieve consensus through feigned 
expertise (i.e., the ends justifies the means); so, they may actually believe this to be a 
morally-clean tactic.”160 While disagreement exists among scholars, the common 
conception of Machiavelli is that he was a consequentialist who believed one’s desired 
ends could justify even ruthless or underhanded means.161 Thus, one could consider this 
concession to Machiavelli evidence of consequentialism in the SF Ethic since the 
handbook offers no further explanation of when or to what extent planners “should pay 
respects” to Machiavelli—by simply being aware of or by implementing such strategies.  
2. Non-consequentialism 
Integrity, another of the “top rated” SF attributes “triad,” means “trustworthy and 
honest; acts with honor; unwavering adherence to high ethical standards, without 
guidance or supervision.”162 Accordingly, integrity permits autonomy (an ARSOF Unit 
Characteristic, Figure 3) due to trust between principal and agent. For the 
USAJFKSWCS, excellence in integrity includes being “100% ethical when negotiating 
and unquestionably loyal to the team.” In the SOCM, integrity falls under character—
along with courage, self-discipline, empathy, humility, leadership, and judgment. I argue 
that while the first three align with non-consequentialism, the last three are best described 
as prudential. Character in SOCM is “the aggregate traits that determine how a person 
                                                 
159 USASOC, USASOC Planner’s Handbook, VII-8.  
160 These consensus building strategies are adapted from Marcia V. Wilkof (1989), “Organizational 
Culture and Decision Making: A Case of Consensus Management,” in R&D Management 19, no. 2: 185–
200.   
161 John Swain, “Machiavelli and Modern Management,” in Management Decision 40, no. 3: 281–
287. 
162 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
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behaves, especially when under stress.”163 Thus, while its components are deontological, 
in aggregate, character is aretaic.  
Courage, in SOCM, includes “willing[ness] to act in the face of danger or 
adversity for the greater good.” Courageous means “understands calculated risk; able to 
overcome fear of failure; sacrifices for a larger cause or purpose; stands up for beliefs; is 
not intimidated.”164 Courageousness, as a trait by itself, may be morally neutral since it 
could be used for noble or ignoble cause. However, the ARSOF explanation seems to 
imply protecting the intrinsic good. Therefore, unless one presumes that “calculated risk” 
implies outcome-based moral risk-taking, courageousness appears to be framed in a 
deontological manner.  
For similar reasons, the team player trait, which is “reliable; loyal; respects 
others; values diversity; selfless; contributes to a larger cause or purpose; tireless... 
dependable in all situations with all tasks” seems deontological.165 An excellent team 
player “always puts the team first, will work with anyone on the team to further the 
mission; seeks to lead and motivate all members...seeks to form consensus in all 
situations; selflessly gives the team the credit.” The SF Value cohesion is the result of 
and encompasses the attribute team player.  
The first SOF truth “Humans are more important than hardware,” and the SOF 
Imperative, “Engage the threat discriminately,” seem likewise non-consequentialist. The 
SF Core Value cultural awareness relates to empathy, which is the ability to “understand 
the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another person, group, or culture.”  
The final overarching individual trait, love, which expresses “an idea of selfless, 
brotherly love is a sacred bond of commitment “that transcends everything...even 
death.”166 It is a love for their job, their country, the mission, their team, their fellow 
                                                 
163 USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model,” D-3. 
164 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., 43. ARSOF Next uses the Greek agape form of love, but perhaps phileo is a better fit since 
the former is more often the love for (and from) God, while the latter is usually brotherly love. 
 50
warriors. “ARSOF warriors have a capacity for love that is unique in its intensity...those 
who lack it will...fake it, because they recognize they cannot remain without it.”167 Love 
seems to mean a profound respect for others, and thus is non-consequentialist.  
3. Prudence 
The third “top rated” trait among ARSOF soldiers is the last “triad” attribute, 
professionalism. Professionalism exists as an SF attribute (Figure 4) and an SF value 
(Figure 5). Professionalism means to serve as a Green Beret standard bearer, who 
exhibits mature judgment, “confidence tempered by humility; forms candid opinions and 
makes independent decisions; accountable and characterized by honorable service; a 
steward of the army profession.”168 He exhibits logical reasoning, and decisive 
leadership. Likewise, judgment is the ability to “make considered decisions or come to 
sensible conclusions.”169 Accordingly, in response to the above-mentioned tension, the 
use of sound, professional judgment, in the face of apparent moral conflict, seems to 
align with prudence (discussed in Chapter IV). 
4. Other or Neutral Terms 
Perseverance means “committed and resolved...a motivated and optimistic self-
starter” who is “emotionally balanced and never quits.”170 This could be deontological in 
the sense that one should persistently develop oneself or pursue the good as a universal 
rule (as mentioned above), but since one could just as well persevere in an evil cause, this 
trait could also be neutral.  
Personal responsibility is anticipating tasks and beginning work, seeking 
responsibility, especially during difficult times, and is accountable. It has to do with 
motivation and proactivity. Likewise, self-discipline, the ability to control one’s behavior, 
                                                 
167 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
168 Ibid. 
169 USSOCOM, “Special Operator Competency Model, January,” D-3. 
170 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
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has to do with willpower and is related to extrinsic and intrinsic motivational forces. 
These attributes have to do with compliance theory and commitment (Chapter III).  
Capability (operational aptitude) refers to excellence in knowledge, planning, 
evaluations, communications, fitness, and overall performance. A capable operator is a 
“fit, strong, and agile technical and tactical expert,” who “effectively plans, 
communicates, and understands the operational environment.” Since aptitude could be 
used for good or evil, this trait is also morally neutral.171  
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
While clear aspects of deontology exist throughout the SF Ethic, a trend or 
positive correlation with consequentialism seems to exist as we move toward the tip of 
the spear: from societal values to strategic, operational, and tactical or from conventional 
army to unconventional normative ethics. As one might expect, when it comes to actually 
getting things done, more pragmatic or ends-related considerations seem to increase in 
importance.  
From the above analysis made in Chapter II, I conclude that the SF Ethic is a mix 
of consequentialism, deontology and aretaic thought. The idea of “balanced judgment” 
suggests that an adaptation of Aristotle’s “Doctrine of the Mean” may serve as a useful 
construct for framing a more effective process of responding to ethical dilemmas. 
Specifically, the notion of aretaic prudence, in which judgment is applied by experienced 
professionals, may help resolve a tension between adaptability and integrity or 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism. The organizational theory construct 
professionalism is described in Chapter III; aretaic prudence is discussed in Chapter IV.  
Many or most of the “ingredients” for optimal effectiveness exist within the SF 
Ethic. However, (suboptimal) organization and prioritization of terms, as well as the lack 
of a clear doctrinal method for how SF professionals can reconcile ethical dilemmas, 
hinders optimal application of the SF Ethic in practice. These limitations negatively 
impact the organizational effectiveness of the SF Regiment.  
                                                 
171 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 35. 
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A significant recommendation from this section is that USSOCOM and USASOC 
synthesize and organize the various conceptions of “values,” “attributes,” “traits,” 
“principles,” and “characteristics,” etc. Furthermore, one might ask, why did “personal 
responsibility” replace “intelligence” as an ARSOF attribute when the former term may 
correlate with better outcomes in empirical studies?172 According to FM 3–05.20, 
“inherent” in every SF soldier is “maturity, core values, warrior ethos, technical and 
tactical competency, and flexibility.”173 Like the seven “models” I considered and 
consolidated in Figure 8, the preceding sentence typifies the ad hoc manner in which 
values and principles seem to be combined. Within the models I considered, 
professionalism and character are both considered “attributes” and “values.” Integrity is 
both an “attribute” and a sub “attribute” of character. Adaptability is an “attribute” and a 
“unit characteristic” and a sub “attribute” of intelligence. Definitions of the same term 
vary from one publication to another. However, a common framework of terms and 
greater consistency on definitions across publications would help operators think more 
clearly about the SF ethical principles and how to apply them. A common vernacular 
would also facilitate dialogue among team members about the right course of action to 
take in a given situation.  
The Army and Special Forces rely on deliberate, systematic processes. Likewise, I 
recommend a logical hierarchy of normative ethical and values terms be established in 
line with Pojman’s “Schema of Moral Processes.”174 SOF should clearly define the 
values that inform SOF principles and try to provide organization and a sense of 
prioritization. Principles clarify the “action-guiding or prescriptive force latent in 
values,” e.g., “the principle of honesty is derived from the value, integrity.”175 And when 
one or more principles apply to a situation, the use of judgment adjudicates, e.g., truthful 
reporting. Organization of terms can be achieved by specifying which terms are 
subordinate to or are entailed by other terms. Essentially, Pojman would consider many 
                                                 
172 Thanks to Dr. Erik Jansen, NPS, for this observation.  
173 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 1–4. 
174 Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, the “Schema of the Moral Process,” 94. 
175 Ibid., 93. 
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“attributes” principles. For example, the attribute (principle) empathy is derived from the 
intrinsic value of human life and relationships.  
Such a deliberate organization of terms will help refine the Individual Student 
Assessment Plan (ISAP) at the SFQC as well as assist operators to make decisions in 
real-life ambiguous environments through a more coherent values system. Also, adding a 
formal block of instruction during the SFQC on SF values and ethics—there currently is 
none—is another important recommendation since judgments, decisions, and actions all 
flow from the unit’s normative underpinnings.176 If systematic and deliberate 
organization is important—and the Army and SF strongly suggest that it is important in 







                                                 
176 Discussion with CPT Mike DiPietro on October 10, 2017. 
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III. THE SPECIAL FORCES ENVIRONMENT AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Effective managing happens where art, craft, and science meet. 
— Henry Mintzberg177 
Organizational theorists have noted that “social actions are not context free, but 
are constrained and shaped by the setting in which they occur.”178 Having discussed the 
SF Ethic, we transition from normative moral philosophy to organizational theory to 
describe the context in which the SF Ethic is at work. Chapter III is divided into two 
sections. The first briefly considers the SF organization’s general environment, task 
environment, structure, human resource flow, and culture—all factors at the 
organizational level of analysis.179 The second section analyzes individual factors—
commitment, trust, and professionalism—that connect the SF Ethic to the Regiment’s 
effectiveness.  
A. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Beginning with the storied Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II, 
Army Special Forces (SF) has developed organizational structures that share little in 
common with the “big” army. Like the conventional Army, the SF Regiment is divided 
into companies, battalions, and brigades—although the latter are referred to as “groups” 
in SF. Aside from this titular commonality, these organizations are quite different. This is 
because SF missions and methods differ vastly from the conventional army’s and 
therefore necessitate a modified organizational design.  
The most drastic divergence from the conventional Army structure occurs at the 
company-level and below. The company headquarters, or SFOD-B, is structured more 
                                                 
177 Henry Mintzberg, Managers Not MBAs (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2004), 10.  
178 Palthe, “Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Elements of Organizations,” 62. 
179 This section will also include the group level of analysis. Chapter III-A is in part the product of 
Organizational Design research conducted in 2017 by MAJs Eric Hoelscher, Jonathan Kingsley, and 
William Morgan at the Naval Postgraduate School under the guidance of Dr. Erik Jansen.   
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like a battalion staff than a traditional infantry company headquarters. The SF Company’s 
heavily decentralized management and employment of its subordinate elements provide 
another stark contrast to the traditional company. However, the most significant 
contrasting feature is that the SFOD-B’s subordinate elements, SFOD-As, are manned 
completely by specially selected, trained and experienced soldiers who achieve results by 
working by, with, and through indigenous forces.   
Synchronizing and sustaining six teams of experienced Green Berets, executing 
different mission sets, interacting with multiple stakeholders, and operating in disparate 
and evolving environments, is a complex task, which in turn necessitates autonomy and 
empowerment at the lowest level. In accordance with Structural Contingency Theory, this 
section will analyze the organizational design structure that enables SF operations given 
the organization’s general and task environment.180 In the terms of organizational theory, 
in SF the operational core (the lower ranks) is more highly professionalized.  
1. Environment 
Daft divides the organizational environment into two aspects: the general 
environment and the task environment. I will explain each aspect in turn, as they relate to 
SF. The general environment is composed of those elements and factors that indirectly 
effect the organization.181 FM 3–05.20 notes that “The global security environment has 
become increasingly complex, significantly less stable.”182 Likewise, fiscal, political and 
military changes in the environment at the strategic level often indirectly affect the SF 
unit. For example, the change from a Democratic administration to a Republican will 
change national strategy and policy, which will indirectly effect SOF’s utilization, 
budget, authorities and restrictions.  
                                                 
180 Henry Mintzberg provides an overview of Structural Contingency Theory—the view that, to be 
effective, organizations should be structured to “fit” variable contingencies in the organization’s general 
and task environment. Henry Mintzberg details these considerations in, “Organization Design: Fashion or 
Fit?” Harvard Business Review (January-February 1981): 1–16. 
181 Richard Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory & Design (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western 
College, 2001). Ch. 3, “External Environment,” 48–49. 
182 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 1–3. 
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The USASOC Planner’s Handbook notes that, “Collectively, [strategic guidance] 
documents illustrate a complex FOE [future operating environment] best characterized by 
uncertainty; ill-structured, population-centric security challenges; constrained resources; 
and waning popular tolerance or endurance for large-scale extended conflict.”183 Public 
support for national strategies directly affects congressional budget allocations for those 
endeavors. It is also the reason that politicians are generally uncomfortable with risk. 
Low risk-tolerance is not unique to politicians; it affects senior military commanders as 
well. These factors shape the way wars are fought, how SOF is employed, and ultimately 
limit potential effectiveness.  
Finally, there is a misperception resulting from representations in television and 
movies that all SOF are terrorist hunters, almost wholly disregarding the COIN, security 
force assistance (SFA), FID, UW and IO mission sets. In other words, many fail to 
appreciate the degree to which “Special Forces units are designed to operate in complex 
and uncertain environments.”184 This misunderstanding risks leaving military and 
political decision makers ill-equipped to make informed decisions regarding SOF’s 
application. While indeed some elements of SOF do hunt terrorists, this is not the SF 
organization’s primary mission. This false perception risks promoting a “whack-a-mole” 
strategy and rewards an unsuccessful strategy with more money, resources, and prestige.   
The task environment, on the other hand, comprises elements and factors that 
directly impact the organization’s pursuit of its goals.185 The task environment defines 
the work, and the work creates the context for structure. In the case of SF, structural 
contingency theory indicates the most appropriate fit for such a task environment is a 
hybrid professional bureaucracy-adhocracy (using Mintzberg’s configuration theory). 
Figure 8 depicts the SF operational task environment in terms of functions and eight core 
                                                 
183 USASOC, USASOC Planner’s Handbook, VIII-1. 
184 USASOC, “ARSOF 2022,” 12. 
185 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory & Design, Ch. 3, “External Environment,” 48–49. 
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activities.186 Within the figure, complexity and stability define a space that relates to the 
structural configuration (i.e., the hybrid professional bureaucracy-adhocracy structure) 
and the properties that predict an organization’s probability of effectiveness. The 
probability of effectiveness increases when the organization’s structure fits the task 
environment in which it is required to function (given its missions). Organizational 
structure will be discussed after the task environment.  
 
The Task Environment illustrates where the company functions and core SF activities lie 
within the complexity-stability space.  
Figure 8.  Task Environment 
As Figure 8 suggests, the core activities generally lie on the complex end of the 
spectrum, with the most challenging missions (UW, COIN, and CP) residing in the 
unstable and complex region. Most notably, Unconventional Warfare (UW), which lies in 
the most complex and most unstable region, is “the core SF mission.”187 The green ovals 
depict the company functions. While the administrative function is relatively stable and 
                                                 
186 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, Ch. 2, “Guidance and Principal 
Tasks,”  SOF’s 8 Core Activities are Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), Counterterrorism 
(CT), Counter-proliferation (CP), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID), Information Operations (IO) and Unconventional Warfare (UW). 
187 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 1–4. Emphasis mine. 
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simple, the logistics support (SUPCEN) and C2 functions (OPCEN) fluctuate in 
complexity and stability in correlation with the SFODAs’ assigned core activities. The 
complexity of executing these functions is increasingly compounded when subordinate 
elements are assigned diverse core activities or the AOB is assigned a mission of its own. 
The task environment is also affected by constant changes in the physical 
environment, the human domain, and time. While some units deploy repeatedly to the 
same country and province, many others will deploy several times before returning to the 
same country, much less the same province with the same people. This constant change 
requires a new analysis of factors such as weather, geography, topography. Increased 
distance between elements can further complicate the procurement and distribution of 
logistics. The amount of existing infrastructure is another significant consideration. In 
established theaters like Afghanistan, logistics, basing, and communications systems are 
already established and integrating into them is relatively simple. Expeditionary 
countries, in contrast, force the SF element to develop new infrastructure and processes 
from scratch.   
In terms of the human domain, interpersonal relationships are critical to an SF 
unit’s success. Every time the unit deploys to a new country, it is forced to navigate the 
process of developing new relationships. Whether that means building rapport with the 
host-nation counterparts or coordinating with members of the JIIM community, it is a 
critical, but time-consuming process. This is further complicated by the degree of 
“permissiveness” of a country.188 Missions in friendly countries are far less complicated 
than conducting operations in “hostile” environments, where the SF element must 
conceal its existence from the state or other occupying power. 
Time is another critical environmental factor. Missions such as FID, COIN, and 
UW take years to execute effectively. However, SF AOBs and ODAs generally deploy 
                                                 
188 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations. A permissive environment is 
defined as an “Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have 
control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.”  A hostile 
environment is defined as “Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the 
intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.” 
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for six months. Thus, the unit will only complete a portion of the campaign plan and must 
be prepared to hand the remainder over to its relieving unit, hoping that the plan and 
work is carried forward. Furthermore, commanders and decision makers are often 
impatient, demanding results before subordinate elements can feasibly accomplish them. 
These factors place significant time pressures on an SF unit and can produce detrimental 
effects. 
Overall, for SF to be effective given its general and task environment requires 
continued professionalization of the whole system including the education to make 
autonomous judgments, at increasingly lower levels, about complex problems. It also 
means lateral communications, including direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) is 
essential.189 These considerations relate to the organizational structure, which is 
discussed next.  
2. Organizational Structure 
A key function of structure is to align power and information. The SF company is 
operationally structured as a professional bureaucracy, but often operates as an adhocracy 
due to the complexity and instability of its environment, which requires significant 
mutual adjustment, collaboration, and coordination. Thus, an SF company is usually 
configured as a professional bureaucracy-adhocracy hybrid, and is slightly modified 
depending on the situation.  
Constructing a universal prototype to show how an AOB and its ODAs always 
operate is not feasible. However, a recent example still provides a general idea of how an 
typical AOB might operate, now or in the future. The structure and processes discussed in 
this section will accordingly reflect an AOB conducting combat operations in 
Afghanistan. It is important to remember this caveat because without it the permutations 
and potential counter-arguments would be endless.  
                                                 
189 “DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly 
consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.” 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. 
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During Afghan combat operations, the AOB resembles an adhocracy with 
features similar to a professional bureaucracy. It is like an adhocracy in terms of having a 
professional core that is supported by a robust support staff, and whose structure narrows 
at the strategic apex (Figure 9). Additionally, the lines between the techno-structure, 
support staff, and midline are extremely blurred.190 It also has characteristics of a 
professional bureaucracy in that highly experienced and trained experts who are expected 
to make complex judgments are concentrated in the professional core. By contrast an 
adhocracy’s experts are dispersed throughout all the other parts of the structure (i.e., not 
just in the core but also in what are blurred staff and midline positions).191  
The professional core consists of up to six Operational Detachment-Alphas 
(ODAs), which each contain approximately twelve soldiers. These soldiers undergo 
between 18 months and two years of training to become qualified as Special Forces 
soldiers.192 Thus, professional specialization and standardization at the operational core 
level is extremely high; this is similar to both adhocracies and professional 
bureaucracies.193 These professionalized soldiers are then inserted into a team where they 
carry out tasks specific to their individual specialization (i.e., weapons, communications, 
engineering, intelligence, and medical); this again suggests organic processes of an 
adhocracy. Furthermore, adhocratic flexibility comes from decentralization and the 
lateral processes that become at least as important as the vertical processes (e.g., teams of 
teams, liaisons, and task groups).  
                                                 
190 Mintzberg, Organization Design: Fashion Or Fit, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Harvard University (February 1981), 11. 
191 Mintzberg, Organization Design: Fashion Or Fit, 10. 
192 USAJFKSWCS, Intro to the Special Forces Regiment, power point brief used for new students 
throughout 2016. 
193 Mintzberg, Organization Design: Fashion Or Fit, 10. 
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Figure 9.  Mintzberg-Adapted SF Company Configuration 
Regarding the professional core, each ODA usually operates in a divisional 
element within the AOB. These divisions are a means of managing task complexity 
though decentralization as well as increasing—over time—allowing operators to gain 
experience relevant to their particular task environment. ODAs are generally used to 
effect a specific area separate from other ODAs, which gives each ODA mission its own 
unique qualities and needs. As previously mentioned, the specific elements and factors 
that generate environmental complexity and stability vary for each ODA. Therefore, 
establishing specific mechanistic processes that reliably lead to effective results tends to 
be difficult or impossible.194 The AOB’s subordinate elements generally maintain pooled 
interdependence with respect to each other, and each ODA is affected by finite resources 
that the AOB judiciously allocates.195 These resources range from personnel support to 
aerial assets.196 This support limitation requires mutual adjustment; ODAs thus need to 
maintain regular horizontal communication to ensure that one operation does not use so 
                                                 
194 Daft, Essentials Of Organization Theory And Design, Chapter “Environmental Domain and 
Adapting to Uncertainty,” 52. 
195 Ibid., Chapter “Workflow Interdependence Among Departments,” 277.  
196 As observed by MAJs Eric Hoelscher, Jonathan Kingsley, and William Morgan during four 
deployments to Afghanistan. 
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many vital resources that it restricts the operations of another ODA. Consequently, the 
interdependence between ODAs fluctuates between pooled and sequential.197 In this 
case, the output of one ODA operation is not only the successful completion of the 
mission, but also the release of vital assets for another ODA. The released assets can then 
be input into an adjacent ODA’s operation, making the interdependence sequential. Many 
times, horizontal coordination is enough to synchronize operations; however, other times 
there are irreconcilable conflicts between the ODAs. Often this conflict results because 
ODAs do not have complete visibility of adjacent operations or a full awareness of the 
theater commander’s priorities. These issues are the reason for the existence for the 
support staff, otherwise known as the B-Team. 
The B-Team operates within several different functional groups: administration, 
intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and enabler support (Civil Affairs, 
Psychological Operations, etc.).198 This kind of horizontal mechanism is what one would 
expect to find among units with this kind of interdependence in complex, unstable and 
hence uncertain task environments. Each function serves different tasks for the AOB and, 
at times, works departmentally, especially within the administrative and logistical arenas. 
However, a primary function of an AOB is to support operations and, in doing so, many 
of the functions integrate to develop a balanced approach to the entire area in which the 
AOB is operating.199 
3. Selection, Training, and Socialization 
The human resource (HR) flow for AOB personnel includes the following 
components: recruitment, selection, training pipeline, career management (progression), 
placement, operational rotations, promotions, turnover, and retirement. Special Forces 
personnel either come from different Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), or they 
join the Army with an “x-ray” contract, meaning they enter directly into the SF training 
                                                 
197 Daft, Essentials Of Organization Theory And Design, Chapter “Workflow Interdependence Among 
Departments,” 278. 
198 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 2–27 to 3–28. 
199 Ibid., 2–27. 
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“pipeline.” After completing Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS), trainees 
attend the SF Qualification Course (SFQC). Officers also attend the SOF Captain’s 
Career Course. During the SFQC, trainees are segmented into their respective specialties, 
where they gain standardized skills in one of the following: Command (18A), Weapons 
and Tactics (18B), Engineering and Demolitions (18C), Medicine and Trauma Care 
(18D), and Communications (18E). Throughout the training, cadre provide mentorship, 
indoctrination into the SF culture and continue to identify trainees who demonstrate 
behavior that is maladaptive to SF culture.  
The final exercise, Robin Sage, brings the trainees from all 18 series MOS’s 
together to conduct a realistic training event as a team. Here experienced prior SF 
soldiers conduct in-role mentorship of the trainees and challenge trainees with 
operational and ethical dilemmas. Upon graduation, Green Berets transition to their units 
and then conduct six weeks of “green platoon” training in which they gain further 
specialized, standardized technical skills, including procedures, operating specialized 
equipment, and infiltration / exfiltration techniques. They also begin socialization and 
indoctrination into their respective units’ culture.  
Aspects of culture that are part of indoctrination include developing a shared 
identity, assumptions, meanings, values, mindsets, perceptions, ideology, and norms. 
Individual Green Berets come to understand what their peers and the organization 
expects of them. Here they begin to experience normative pressures including 
competition in marksmanship and physical training. A key message in SF education is, 
“It pays to be a winner.” The “winner” is rewarded both extrinsically and intrinsically. 
Internalization of values and norms allows members to become self-directing and 
autonomous, which is necessary given the organization’s organic and decentralized 
structure, as well as the complex, quickly changing environment. They also receive on 
the job training to fulfil ad hoc requirements and cross-functional training to understand 
the other team members’ roles, which helps members generate synergistic effects. In 
contrast, “enablers,” or non-Special Forces members of the AOB receive specialized 
training to fulfil narrower roles and duties.  
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Table 2 depicts the AOB personnel composition. Of note, all but three are 18 
series (Green Berets). This table represents what an AOB should look like, doctrinally. 
However, in reality, AOBs are rarely manned with an executive officer, assistant 
operations sergeant, junior communications sergeants, or supply specialist. The AOB is 
usually populated with operators who have completed two to four years on an ODA. 
While AOB personnel “should be” the most experienced and competent members of the 
organization, due to personnel shortages, AOB commanders often allow the ODAs to 
retain the best operators.  
Table 2.   AOB Modified Table of Organization (MTOE) 
Position MOS Professional Military Education 
Supplementary 
Education Function/Role 
Commander 18A SFQC, OBC, CCC, ILE JM, Postgraduate School C2 
SGM 18Z SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC, SMA  Various Schools C2, Maneuver, Sustainment 
Exec. Officer 18A SFQC, OBC, CCC   Sustainment, C2 
Ops Warrant 180A SFQC, WOBC, WOAC Intel Manager’s Course, JM C2, Intel 
Ops Sgt. 18Z SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC JM Maneuver, Fires, Intel 
Ass. Ops Sgt. 18B SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC   Maneuver, Fires 
Intel Sgt. 18F SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC, SFISC   Intel 
Weapons Sgt. 18B SFQC, BLC, ALC  SFARTIC Fires, Maneuver, Protection 
Engr. Sgt. 18C SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC,  UMO, HAZMAT Logistics, Protection 
Medical Sgt. 18D SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC,  Non-Trauma Module, Med-refresher 
Sustainment, 
Protection 
Snr. Commo Sgt. 18E SFQC, BLC, ALC, SLC,  JTAC C2, Fires 
Jnr. Commo Sgt. 
(x2) 18E SFQC, BLC, ALC 
  
C2 
Supply Sgt. 92Y3P MOS, BLC   Sustainment 
Supply Specialist 92Y MOS   Sustainment 
Chemical NCO 74D MOS, BLC   Sustainment 
 
Doctrine is not reality. While the Professional Military Education (PME) shown 
on the table is largely accurate, supplementary education varies, as do roles and 
functions. No PME exists to assist in the transition from ODA to AOB. As previously 
alluded to in the structure portion of this paper, AOB members learn all their roles and 
how to fulfil their functions on the job. Disparities in education and experience among 
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those who report to the AOB results in an ad-hoc division of labor. Often the functions, 
roles, and additional duties do not correspond to the assigned position title. Likewise, 
individual Green Berets on ODAs, despite their specialized MOS training, employ their 
professional knowledge and expertise to adapt in an ad hoc fashion to unique task 
environments. This ad hoc set up is (potentially) ripe for overworked top performers and 
free-riders given the difficulty supervisors have in judging workload or assessing how 
long an assigned task should take. 
While NCOs may remain on one or more ODAs for five to ten years, assignments 
to the AOB are also usually short in duration, sometimes a year or less. Such high 
turnover and lack of formal training limits the AOB’s effectiveness. It is rare to see the 
same personnel on an AOB for a second deployment. As a result, the continuity between 
deployments is often lost and systems are repeatedly recreated. To offset these problems, 
AOBs sometimes receive personnel augmentation from non-deployed AOBs or ODAs.200 
For a more formalized structure and training regimen to emerge from this ad hoc system 
would require a larger budget and a lower operational tempo.  
Army Human Resources Command (HRC) dictates the promotion schedules and 
manages the personnel evaluation system. However, each NCO and officer is evaluated 
annually and is in direct competition with his peers. Commanders rank order the 
personnel under their command numerically and can use particular verbiage to strengthen 
or weaken a member’s file for promotion review. Thus, the team and AOB leadership are 
able to re-task operators who fail to perform autonomously as professionals.  
4. Culture and Ethic 
The preceding section has illustrated the non-technical human dynamics at work 
in an SF company onto which we project organizational theory. Having considered the 
environment, structure, and human resource flow, the final organizational level of 
analysis factor to be covered here is culture. This section begins to demonstrate the 
                                                 
200 ARSOF 2022 describes the USASOC commander’s directive to “operationalize the CONUS base” 
to provide support to deployed AOBs and ODAs and to serve as a conduit between the deployed unit and 
the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC).  
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ethics-effectiveness link in earnest, relying heavily on established organizational theory 
models. The SF Ethic is largely considered synonymous with culture to align with both 
army doctrine and organizational theory. ADRP 1 calls culture and ethic “integrated, 
interdependent, evolving, and enduring.”201 Thus, the SF Ethic cannot be divided from 
the SF culture; the two must be considered together.  
Culture, in SF, is a coordination mechanism that supports the professional 
adhocracy with values that are a hybrid of consequentialism, non-consequentialism, and 
virtue ethics. According to Richard Daft, “culture reinforces the strategy and structural 
design the organization needs to be effective in its environment.”202 Cultures, “influence 
behaviors and shape the identity of their members [and] reflect what is acceptable and 
functionally effective…essentially how we do things.”203 An organization’s culture is 
deeply embedded and difficult to change, unlike climate (members’ feelings and 
attitudes), which can often be changed quickly.  
According to ADRP 1, the professional Army Ethic is, “the evolving set of laws, 
values, and beliefs, embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivates and guides 
the conduct of Army professionals bound together in a common moral purpose…to do 
the right thing for the right reason in the right way.”204 Similar to the definition of ethic, 
culture is “the set of values, guiding beliefs, understandings, and ways of thinking that is 
shared by members of an organization and taught to new members as correct.”205 
Furthermore, according to Daft, “Of the values that make up an organization’s culture, 
ethical values are now considered among the most important.”206 Thus, we can conclude 
that ethic is essentially tantamount to culture and that, to a significant extent, what an 
organization’s culture affects, its ethic likewise affects. 
                                                 
201 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, A-1. 
202 Richard Daft, Essentials Of Organization Theory And Design, Chapter “Organizational Culture 
and Ethical Values,” 112. 
203 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, A-1. 
204 Ibid., 1–1, 1–2. 
205 Daft, “Organizational Culture and Ethical Values,” 112. 
206 Ibid., 119. 
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Organizational theory also shows a direct connection between culture and 
effectiveness via several organizational theory models. The Hill-McCaskey model shows 
a direct link between group culture and effectiveness, the latter being the model’s final 
output (Figure 10). Similarly, Michael McCaskey’s model shows that culture leads 
directly to outputs, which lead to outcomes (Figure 11). Likewise, in Jansen’s adaptation 
of Galbraith’s framework, culture is an emergent factor that directly ties to organizational 
performance (Figure 12). The fact that performance is an element of effectiveness in the 
Hill-McCaskey model provides further support to the direct connection between culture 
and effectiveness.207 Furthermore Daft notes, “CEOs say that organizational culture is 
the most important mechanism for attracting, motivating, and retaining talented people,” 
which, in turn, Daft points out, is the “single best predictor of overall excellence.”208 Daft 
also asserts, “Many researchers underline...specifically the importance of organizational 
culture for the effectiveness of the organization.”209 Thus, overall a picture forms that, 
according to major design frameworks within organizational theory, culture directly 
relates to effectiveness.  
This section has provided an argument that appears to reveal a strong relationship 
between (a) ethics and culture and between (b) culture and effectiveness. If this argument 
succeeds, we can then posit a relationship showing that ethics and effectiveness are 
strongly related, in support of this thesis’ original contention.210  
                                                 
207 Hill-McCaskey Model. 
208 Daft, “Organizational Culture and Ethical Values,” 112. 
209 Daft is cited in Krumov et al., “Organizational management and organizational effectiveness,” 307, 
which specifically mentions concurring researchers J.B. Barney, A. Wilkins, and W.G. Ouchi. 
210 This deduction is possible via hypothetical syllogism, a chain of reasoning that uses a transitive 
relationship between variables. 
 69
 
Figure 10.  Hill-McCaskey Model 
 
Figure 11.  McCaskey Model 
 70
 
Figure 12.  Jansen’s Adaptation of Galbreath’s Star Model 
B. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Having completed a review of the important contextual factors at the 
organizational level of analysis—environment, structures, human resources, and 
culture—we now turn to the individual level of analysis to understand the decisions and 
behaviors of operators. Here we cover commitment, trust, and professionalism, elements 
of organizational theory that seem to lend significant empirical support to the SF Ethic-
effectiveness link.  
1. Commitment, Reward Systems, and Moral Factors 
While culture is a shared understanding or mindset, commitment is an individual 
one. This section focuses on a recent theory of commitment to describe why SF operators 
do what they do. Commitment is a better predictor of effectiveness than individual 
perceptions or affective mindsets about an organization, which relate the feelings or 
attitudes of members without directly relating these to their (potential) actions. That is to 
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say, “the summary evaluation of a target is distinct from volitional dedication [i.e., 
commitment] to a target.”211 That is, commitment leads to dedicated actions.  
Furthermore, the following theory of commitment parsimoniously incorporates 
other prior theories that included considerations such as extrinsic and intrinsic reward 
systems, motivation, and compliance. Equally important is the fact that the theory’s four 
components or “bond types” reflect a largely parallel structure to the normative-ethical 
component of this thesis from Chapter II, including the “neutral attributes” that the SF 
Regiment values but that are not clearly consequentialist or deontological.  
Last, commitment is an excellent metric because it aligns with identification; in 
fact, according to Klein, “measures of organizational commitment and identification are 
largely indistinguishable.”212 Since identification is “the merging of the self with the 
target,” identification predicts that an individual will do what is good for the 
organization, as he would for himself. Such behavior, when incorporated into the culture 
at large, logically correlates with organizational effectiveness. The theory of commitment 
provides the mechanism or process by which ethical frameworks are instantiated as 
actions that effect the organization’s internal process and external effectiveness.  
The authors consider their theory of commitment “a more precise theory [than its 
predecessors] for understanding and managing workplace commitment bonds.” They 
conceive of commitment as “a particular type of bond reflecting volitional dedication and 
responsibility for...any workplace target.”213 They further describe commitment as a 
“continuum” of discrete bond types: (1) acquiescence, (2) instrumental, (3) commitment, 
and (4) identification.214 Table 3 summarizes each bond type’s defining features, how 
individuals experience each bond type, “the corollaries of experiencing the different bond 
                                                 
211 A target is “the specific foci to which a bond is formed (e.g., the “organization, professional 
associations, supervisors, work teams, projects, decisions, goals, values, career),” Howard Klein, Janice 
Malloy, and Chad Brinsfield, “Re-conceptualizing Workplace Commitment to Redress a Stretched 
Construct: Revisiting assumptions and removing confounds,” in Academy of Management Journal 37, no. 1 
(2012): 138. Emphasis mine. 
212 Klein et al., “Re conceptualizing Workplace Commitment,” 133. 
213 Ibid., 130. 
214 Ibid. 
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types,” and how the four bond types align with prior theoretical conceptions of 
commitment.215 
Table 3.   A Continuum of Bonds216 
 
 
At the far left of the continuum is acquiescence, in which a person is committed 
due to extrinsic or external coercive factors, compulsion, or a lack of perceived 
alternatives. Next is instrumental, which is utilitarian, calculative, or transactional. It 
includes intrinsic task motivation, which is deriving happiness or satisfaction from the 
task itself, as one would experience from a hobby. It also includes expectation of 
extrinsic rewards and the desire to avoid aversive situations—including the “costs or 
losses... incurred if the bond was severed.”217 Thus, this second bond type can be taken to 
align roughly with consequentialism. The third bond type is commitment, which “is 
characterized by volition, dedication, and responsibility to the target.”218 This bond type 
aligns with what I described as “neutral” SF attributes that are neither consequentialist 
                                                 
215 Klein et al., “Re conceptualizing Workplace Commitment,” 130. 
216 Source: Ibid., 134. 
217 Ibid., 135. 
218 Ibid. 
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nor non-consequentialist: perseverance, personal responsibility, self-discipline, and 
perhaps capability (operational aptitude).219 “Commitment” attributes of the SOCM 
include: loyalty, tenacity, resilience, dependability, and team-fit (Figure 6).220 The 
last and most critical bond type for SF (for reasons I discuss next) is identification. 
It is a bond that involves normative-moral and emotional or affective connections and 
is related to strong cultures and values. As previously mentioned, identification is 
“merging of the self with the target.”221 It is also the bond most highly related to “values 
maintenance work.”222 
Thus, the bond types at the right end of the continuum are those that most affect 
commitment of SF soldiers given the SF task environment and structure. Accordingly, we 
will consider that end of the spectrum in greater detail. Particularly, Etzioni’s “normative-
affective” or “moral” considerations are germane. These suggest that “people may be 
committed to an organization because they have internalized the norms” and these norms 
“are deeply emotional (grab them by their gut).”223 Dr. Erik Jansen suggests that these 
“normative-affective” internal intrinsic motivations relate to what we might describe as 
“a calling,” “standing tall” or “being proud of being a member (soldier, SEAL, 
professor).” This type of motivation is neither extrinsic nor calculative nor intrinsically 
task-related but seems related to high internalization. This commitment is related to the 
“life’s meaning” that comes from a position. These factors are almost certainly high in 
SF, resulting in high commitment.  
Another important motivation for SF is Intrinsic Task Motivation (ITM): “the 
intrinsic motivational aspects of doing the task itself - versus receiving a reward that is 
                                                 
219 See Chapter II for descriptions of these terms.  
220 USSOCOM, Special Operator Competency Model, D-2. 
221 Klein et al., “Re conceptualizing Workplace Commitment,” 133. 
222 The Emergency Department case in Appendix B describes the “values maintenance work” process. 
223 Thanks to Dr. Erik Jansen, NPS, for this observation. A model of “self-management…that directs 
behavior toward a purpose,” is captured in the Dr. Jansen’s (and Kenneth Thomas’s) “Self-Management 
Process” flow chart in Kenneth Thomas, Intrinsic Motivation at Work: Building Energy and Commitment. 
San Francisco: Berrett-Koeler, 2000, 28. Thomas also discusses “committing to a meaningful purpose” and 
autonomous “self-management” in the same work.  
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contingent on doing the task.”224 ITM is both a better motivator and more available to 
professionals like SF operators than it would be to non-professional employees or 
conventional soldiers. ITM “works in the context of collaboration and innovation” or “the 
adhocratic space” that one might find in an SF team room or AOB.225 Ken Thomas’s 
four-factor theory provides a particularly useful explanation of ITM. For Thomas, ITM 
includes a sense of: (1) progress, (2) purpose, (3) autonomy, and (4) competence. I will 
describe each of these and how they directly relate to SF teams and SF ITM.  
Regular deployment rotations can provide a sense of continuity—and thus a sense 
of progress (which is more affective than normative) in tasks that have a long duration. 
For example, Plan Colombia took more than a decade to fully succeed, but many of those 
involved felt an enduring sense of pride or purpose (a more normative consideration) that 
motivated their behavior, seeing the fruit of their contributions over time. Likewise, 
teams had broad guidance but autonomy in their methods, giving them a sense of control 
over their actions, the situation, and the outcome. ADRP 1 calls autonomy “a high degree 
of discretion.”226 As SF successfully weakened the FARC through their partner force 
they felt a sense of competence. All these ITM factors contribute to commitment.  
Breakdowns occur in ITM when long-term progress is suspect. For example, as an 
ODA commander my motivation to take significant risks in setting up a new remote 
outpost in Afghanistan was diminished by the fact that U.S. withdrawal from the area was 
imminent. Given the importance of intrinsic rewards to desirable operator behavior, the 
following seem to positively associate with commitment: decentralized command and 
control (C2), coaching, providing purpose, permitting choice, “scorekeeping or 
cheering,” and inspiring (leading for meaningfulness).227 Managing SF operators by fear, 
quotas, inappropriate extrinsic rewards, or micromanagement are likely ineffective or 
counterproductive.  
                                                 
224 Dr. Erik Jansen, NPS, via email correspondence, November 13, 2017. 
225 Ibid. 
226 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 1–2. 
227 Thomas, Intrinsic Motivation At Work: Building Energy and Commitment, 47. 
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Because of the important role moral emotions play in the values maintenance 
process, it follows that we should expect to see values maintenance work positively 
correlate with other identification aspects including high concern, high internalization, 
and autonomous motivation (Table 3). These moral emotions seem to indirectly promote 
effectiveness in accordance with the values maintenance process from the Emergency 
Department case study (Appendix B). Briefly, moral emotions—self-critical (shame, 
guilt), other-condemning (contempt, righteous anger, disgust), other-suffering 
(empathetic concern, compassion), and other-praising (pride, elation)—shape 
“perceptions of the rightness or wrongness of particular actions” when evaluated against 
the profession’s values.228 The case’s authors cite “a stream of literature” which has 
argued that moral emotions link moral values and behavior.229 In the study, “Value 
misalignment triggered a cognitive and affective process of [values maintenance] work 
on the part of the…specialist to solve the problem and maintain the…profession’s 
value.”230 Thus, moral emotions of committed individuals can play an important role in 
effectiveness by sustaining professional values—values that are directly related to 
organizational effectiveness. 
We next consider the Process Model of Commitment (PMC) in which Klein et al. 
assert, “commitment is a function of how the target and environment are perceived.”231 
(Figure 13) They identify four perceptual evaluations as most critical to experiencing a 
commitment bond: positive affect (a positively evaluated target), target salience (target’s 
prominence in one’s perception), trust (of various targets), and perceived control (over 
the situation and outcome).232 Presumably all of these are higher in SF than in many 
organizations—correlating with higher commitment.  
 
                                                 
228 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 204, 228.  
229 Ibid., 204. 
230 Ibid., 225. 




Figure 13.  “Process Model of Commitment to Any Workplace Target.”233 
In the preceding paragraphs I have considered the PMC aspects affect and control 
(Etzioni, Thomas, Wright, et al.). Next, I will focus on the trust evaluation. To Klein et 
al., trust occupies “the central role of dedication and responsibility in commitment.” Prior 
research and the Klein theory both ascribe a “strong” connection between trust and 
commitment.234 To provide a more detailed examination of trust, we briefly consider a 
case study of trust carried out in a task environment similar to SF.  
A 2011 study in Academy of Management Journal showed that, “trust in ‘high-
reliability’ task contexts (those marked by high levels of situational unpredictability and 
danger)...was based on coworkers’ integrity.”235 This is contrasted with “typical task 
contexts” in which trust “was also based on benevolence and identification.”236 Also, in 
“high-reliability task contexts” (such as those in which SF often operates) an increase in 
                                                 
233 Source: Klein et al., “Re conceptualizing Workplace Commitment,” 139. 
234 Ibid., 140. 
235 Jason Colquitt, Jeffrey Lepine, Cindy Zapata, and R. Eric Wild, “Trust in Typical and High-
Reliability Contexts: Building and Reacting to Trust among Firefighters,” in Academy of Management 
Journal 54, no. 5 (2011): 999. Integrity is a deontological principle.  
236 Of note, all three of these factors—integrity, benevolence, and identification—are normative-moral 
considerations.  
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trust correlated with an increase in performance.237 The strength of this trust-
performance correlation increased with the frequency of unpredictability and danger.  
Thus, if this study of firefighters is generalizable and sufficiently analogous to SF, 
we might expect that—in the dangerous and unpredictable environment in which SF 
operates—high trust, which itself is a function of integrity, will correlate with higher 
performance and thus effectiveness. To strengthen this correlation further is the strong 
connection that trust fundamentally has to commitment, as Klein et al. identified. We 
might show this connection as follows:  
Integrity  p(trust)  p(performance)  p(effectiveness)   
Thus, these studies seem to support this thesis’ original assertion that:  
Acting ethically  p(organizational effectiveness)  
Army and joint doctrine support the above conclusion: “Trust is earned and 
reinforced as Army professionals contribute to the mission and perform their duty, 
seeking and communicating the truth and acting with integrity. With trust, there is less 
need for detailed guidance and close supervision.”238 Similarly, JP 1 says, “For the joint 
force to function at all, there must be a high degree of mutual trust.”239 ADRP 1 
concludes that the lack of trust is insidious. “If leaders allow disconnects between word 
and deed—between professed values and actual practices—they breed cynicism, 
compromise mutual trust, and degrade organizational esprit de corps…”240 If these 
considerations apply to the army as a whole, they apply even more to SF operators 
working autonomously.  
We might consider the notion that an integrity-effectiveness correlation implies, 
to some degree a connection between a non-consequentialist organizational ethic and 
effectiveness. If this is the case, evidence such as this might suggest that to optimize 
effectiveness, the pendulum of norms should swing toward non-consequentialism to 
                                                 
237 Colquitt et al., “Trust in Typical and High-Reliability Contexts,” 999. 
238 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 3–2. 
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optimize effectiveness. Likewise, if we considered the right end of the commitment 
spectrum non-consequentialist, we would have further instrumental reason to prescribe a 
non-consequentialist ethic to increase effectiveness. The irony here is that this would 
essentially be prescribing a non-consequentialist ethic for consequentialist (ends-based) 
reasons.  
According to the Klein model of commitment, organizational factors, such as 
culture, climate, HR practices, and subcultures are associated with various types of 
commitment.241 HR practices such as “rewards, socialization efforts, mentoring 
programs, flexible work hours, and training”—all of which the SF Regiment offers to one 
degree or another—”can create bonds, which may be experienced as commitment.” 
However, HR practices that “handcuff” employees, such as long re-enlistments for 
sizeable bonuses in the case of SF, “would not be expected to create commitment 
bonds.”242 As the previous discussion suggests, given the SF task environment such 
extrinsic rewards—on their own—are insufficient to elicit the commitment needed to 
make SF effective. As one might expect, studies found that productivity climate and 
burnout climate were associated with higher and lower organizational commitment, 
respectively.243 Clearly “dwell time” and “troop to task” considerations are as important 
to keeping SF effective as the command makes them out to be.244 Again we see an 
alignment between the practicality and intrinsic value in respecting and caring for 
soldiers rather than using them as mere means to a military end.  
The Army as a whole operates within a task environment that is different from 
other organizations, notably because its “work” includes risking or sacrificing one’s own 
lives and the lives of others, and killing those deemed the enemy. Thus, an army is a 
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“moral force.”245 Like the organizational structure, the reward system must align with the 
task environment. As a moral force, the intrinsic is more critical: not just intrinsic to the 
task, but intrinsic in the moral sense. The army agrees. ADRP 1 emphasizes using 
“intrinsic rewards to foster commitment.”246 The SF Regiment faces the same concerns 
but is further challenged by the uncertainty and complexity of the tasks. Thus, the 
identification and internalization at the right end of the commitment continuum seem to 
be more critical in SF than in organizations with different environments or structures.247 
Given the requirement for SF to operate autonomously in such a task environment, we 
would expect effectiveness in SF (even more than conventional forces) to positively 
correlate with the degree to which its members’ bonds align with the right end of the 
continuum.  
The more we professionalize and decentralize in response to the FOE’s 
requirements, the more we ask SF operators to bear the burden of moral responsibility. In 
tasks that involve life and death, emotion laden values expressed by inspirational, 
charismatic, and passionate leaders serve to motivate SF members according to a 
normative-affective dynamic. These values are critical to commitment and motivation 
because they provide justification for the terrible and morally weighty tasks operators are 
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2. Professionalism 
 “Our force must maintain its high degree of professionalism.” 
—LTG Charles Cleveland248 
The last organization theory ethics-effectiveness link to be covered is 
professionalism. If SF leaders and strategic guidance is correct, effectively responding to 
the future operating environment will demand continued or increased professionalization 
of the force. With SF playing such an increasing role in national defense, there seems to 
be a commensurate increasing professionalization of the operational core and increasing 
communication about appropriate professional conduct. This section argues that we can 
expect professionalization of the SF Regiment to positively correlate with organizational 
effectiveness.   
Management theorists Kerr, Von Glinow, and Schriesheim have argued that 
professionalism is a “multidimensional construct” consisting of “five specific attitudinal 
dimensions” or characteristics:  
(1) desire for professional autonomy, (2) commitment to the profession, 
(3) identification with the profession, (4) professional ethics, and (5) belief 
in the collegial maintenance of standards.249  
The attributes align with the requirements of the future operating environment 
(FOE), thus logically implying that professionalization will in fact be important to SF 
effectiveness in that FOE. Furthermore, all five dimensions correspond with the 
identification bond type at the right side of the commitment continuum (Table 3, previous 
section). As mentioned in the previous section, the bond types at the right end of the 
continuum are those that most affect commitment of SF soldiers given the SF task 
environment and structure. Likewise, research shows that the “professional dimensions... 
influenced organizational commitment in a positive direction.” Thus, having established 
the commitment-effectiveness link (in the previous section) the evidence seems to 
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suggest professionalism in SF strongly correlates effectiveness, in large part via the 
former’s connection to organizational commitment.   
Of possible concern, this study found that “Collegial maintenance of standards 
was negatively related to organizational commitment.”250 Professional adhocracies 
require professional standards and collegial maintenance of those standards. However, 
this finding seems to conflict with the emergency department case study (Appendix B), 
which found that “values maintenance work” positively correlates with effectiveness. 
Thus, the effect of these factors seems inconclusive based on two studies.  
In conclusion, for SF, effectiveness seems to correlate with continued 
professionalization of the whole system including (1) education for judgment “to make 
considered decisions,” (2) standards that they have to produce, and (3) prudence, which 
includes balancing higher normative concepts with getting good results.251 Additionally, 
(1) “perceptions of the reward system as valuing professional behavior are associated 
with higher organizational commitment and lower turnover,” and (2) “professional 
attitudes generally were found to be related to greater…commitment to organizations.” 
These factors suggest that more command emphasis on and communication about the 
importance of professional behavior might help catalyze greater commitment—as well as 
the associated effectiveness.252 For example, praising and promoting those who volunteer 
for additional professional education might correlate with higher levels of commitment 
and effectiveness.  
The study offers the caveat that, “Replicative studies also will be necessary to 
establish the generalizability of the present results to other professional groups.”253 Thus, 
ideally, such a study of professionalism in SF would be conducted to confirm the degree 
to which this study’s findings apply to the SF organization.  
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C. CONCLUSIONS: FIT AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The Hill-McCaskey model defines effectiveness as, “Performance, member well-
being and development, shared capacity to adapt and learn.”254 As previously discussed, 
SF is operationally structured as a professional bureaucracy, but often operates as an 
adhocracy due to the complexity and instability of its environment. The environment 
requires significant mutual adjustment, collaboration, and coordination. The 
professionalism and education of the organization’s professional core, high levels of 
commitment and intrinsic motivation, and a willingness to adapt makes it an effective 
structure to achieve success in a dynamically complex task environment. An adhocracy 
can be a difficult organizational structure to control and creates the potential for 
inefficiency or failure due to lack of regulation. However, the Special Forces’ normative 
culture and guiding principles act as regulatory mechanisms to cultivate endogenous 
trust, protect the unit’s reputation, and allay major derailments in effectiveness.  
 
 
                                                 
254 Hill-McCaskey Model. 
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IV. HOW SF ETHICS IMPACT SF EFFECTIVENESS 
Efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is doing the right things.  
— Peter Drucker 
Father of Management Theory255 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having considered the SF Ethic in Chapter II and the organizational context as 
well as organizational theory ethics-effectiveness links in Chapter III, Chapter IV now 
further clarifies what specifically effectiveness means for SF and analyzes what Army and 
SF publications say and imply about the ethics-effectiveness connection. Chapter IV 
includes a discussion of relational influence and reputation (introduced in Chapter I), 
both of which seem to positively correlate with effectiveness. Chapter IV concludes with 
the illustration of the SF “soldier statesman,” made famous by President John F. 
Kennedy, to show how a professional SF operator might use prudence to navigate the 
tension between consequentialism and deontology, adaptability and integrity, or realism 
and idealism in a way that sustains both trust and effectiveness. 
What is the significance of SF being effective; why does SF being effective 
matter? According to the ARSOF Operating Concept, “Irregular warfare, which 
comprises more than three‐quarters of the conflicts in the world today, can be expected to 
predominate in future decades.”256 SF is the nation’s primary and best equipped force for 
irregular warfare. Thus, the future of U.S. national security will be hugely impacted by 
the effectiveness of the SF Regiment as it uses “discreet, precise, politically astute, and 
scalable capabilities” to conduct its irregular warfare tasks.257 
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257 Ibid., 11. 
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B. CONCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS  
What is effectiveness? As described in the introduction, the overarching definition 
of effectiveness used in this thesis is “the degree to which an organization achieves its 
goals.”258 To avoid a stakeholder analysis, which would be a major undertaking and 
would include conflicting answers, we narrowed our definition to “satisfying the purpose 
of the organization’s existence” and “member well-being.” This definition includes the 
SF Regiment’s ability to perform its doctrinal tasks, i.e. “performance.” It thus aligns 
with organizational theorists Daft, Hill, and McCaskey as well as Army doctrine, which 
defines effective as “Likely to accomplish its purpose, accepts prudent risks.”259 
What is the SF Regiment’s purpose? Most broadly, it is the Army’s purpose: “to 
protect our nation against its enemies worldwide.”260 The purpose of ARSOF in the U.S. 
Army’s operating concept is to “Shape operational environments in the countries and 
regions of consequence, Prevent conflict through the application of special operations and 
conventional deterrence, and when necessary help Win our nation’s wars.”261 As we 
narrow the scope further, LTG Charles Cleveland calls the purpose of the Regiment to 
remain, “a relevant and indispensable partner to the joint and interagency team against 
belligerent nations and non-state actors [and terrorist networks] who employ 
nonconventional means against the United States and its allies.”262 Furthermore, the SF 
purpose is to provide national leaders with “the option of applying coercive force to deny 
[the] impunity [of state or non-state actors] across an increasingly large global geographic 
extent... [and to achieve] a favorable, sustainable political solution.”263 
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To further progress from strategic to the operational, Richard Daft calls an 
organization’s mission its “reason for existence” and thus a way to define organizational 
effectiveness. As mentioned in Chapter III, Green Berets’ nine doctrinal missions are:  
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counter-
insurgency, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, information 
operations, counter proliferation of WMD, and security force 
assistance.264  
The Regiment is thus effective to the extent it can accomplish these nine missions. 
C. CONCEPTIONS OF THE ETHICS-EFFECTIVENESS LINK 
Having defined effectiveness, both in general organizational theory terms and in 
terms specific to the SF Regiment, we now consider various conceptions of how the SF 
Ethic leads to effectiveness. There is some overlap among them. Conceptions I discuss 
below include (1) the USASOC Theory of Special Operations, (2) member well-being, 
(3) relational influence, and (4) reputation. Section D will then discuss how the use of 
prudence might correlate with effectiveness.  
Broadly speaking, SF is effective by accomplishing its “goals” or its nine missions 
listed above through the four Pillars of ARSOF Capability:  
(1) an Indigenous Approach to Operations, (2) Precision Targeting 
Operations, (3) Developing Understanding and Wielding Influence, and 
(4) Crisis Response.265 
 Within ARSOF, the human-centric pillars (1) and (3) are particularly important 
for effectiveness in SF, and they appear as a common thread running through the five 
conceptions of the ethics-effectiveness link mentioned above and described next.  
1. USASOC Theory of Special Operations 
USASOC has developed a schema or causal model for effective irregular warfare. 
The model is composed of three tenets (with their subordinate components) that make up 
                                                 
264 “Preparation of the environment” is listed in place of “information operations” in U.S. Dept. of 
Defense, FM 3–05 Army Special Operations, 2014, 4–2; http://www.soc.mil/usasfc/hq.html. 
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a theory of special operations.266 According to the theory of Special Operations 
Operational Art, to be effective, “Special operations campaigns should build a position of 
continuing relative advantage through steady expansion of physical, cognitive, and moral 
access...to favorably influence the population, allies, and enemies.”267 As mentioned in 
Chapter I, USASOC considers expanding such access “the fundamental problem” that SF 
units must overcome to be effective.268 
Special operations campaigns that are effective are designed, with each tactical 
action, to “steadily expand the campaign’s physical, cognitive, and moral access over 
time.” This access creates “a position of continuing relative advantage [and] influence” 
from which to achieve the strategic objective.269 Specifically, to be effective, SOF 
elements must “physically access the terrain where irregulars are fighting, cognitively 
access the opaque situation, and have the moral access to build legitimacy.”270 While one 
might expect the SF Ethic to most impact the moral access tenet (and in turn, 
effectiveness), I argue that the SF Ethic impacts all three tenets—physical, cognitive, and 
moral—because all three require trust, which in turn, is a function of the SF Ethic (as 
described in Chapter III and in further detail below).  
Physical access usually requires establishing a willing—and trustworthy—
reception party and logistical support for the SF team entering the operational area. Both 
the SF element and the host must have some degree of trust for the other as well as an 
expectation that the other party will behave somewhat ethically—at least to one another. 
Likewise, “non-standard” or clandestine logistics, an often necessary component of 
physical access, requires a degree of trust, respect, and ethical behavior, by each partner 
toward the other.  
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Cognitive access, that is, “understanding the physical, human, and enemy 
situations,” is in many ways related to intelligence collection and thus, presumably, a 
degree of trust between principal and agent.271 Furthermore, the USASOC Planner’s 
Handbook suggests that “every soldier” be involved in “defensive, offensive, or political 
intelligence [collection]” through daily interactions with locals.272 For a soldier to have 
any hope of learning useful intelligence from the population, a measure of trust must 
exist between them. A source of information is likely only to risk his or her life if trust 
(born of ethical treatment and respect) between partners exists. Thus, as seen above, even 
the physical and cognitive access tenets seem to be built on trust and ethical treatment of 
each party by the other.   
The third tenet of effective irregular warfare, moral access—is defined as 
“provid[ing] the standing and credibility necessary to form an alliance of interest with the 
host of groups and individuals who at in irregular warfare.”273 As described above, the 
moral access tenet is foundational to the other tenets and allows them to function. If fact, 
moral access, along with coalition warfare, is called, “the very core of irregular and 
special operations warfare.”274 If, (a) the SF Ethic and the ability for SF to generate 
moral access are indeed highly interrelated (as I argue), and (b) moral access is a vital 
component of modern warfare for SF, then it follows that the SF Ethic takes on vital 
operational and strategic significance. We should want to be good for its own sake (Kant) 
and because it is part of a good life (Aristotle). But deontological and aretaic 
considerations aside, the SF Ethic seems to have important consequentialist, instrumental 
significance in making SF effective.  
In further support of the importance of the moral access tenet, Dr. Joe Strange 
notes that the “moral center of gravity” is a salient feature in Clausewitz’s discussion of 
strategic centers of gravity. He further noted that the moral center of gravity is based on 
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public opinion, including perceived legitimacy, which in turn impacts the degree of 
influence SF can project.275 Accordingly, USASOC points to three influence-related 
elements of moral access that “support the pursuit of strategic objectives.” They include:  
…maintaining a strong negotiating position with the principle partners [to 
influence them toward the strategic purpose], building legitimacy [to 
expand the coalition], and dividing the enemy’s coalition [to limit the 
enemy’s influence].276 
The possession of influence and legitimacy, when one’s enemy lacks it, seems to 
be one of the decisive factors related to successful irregular warfare, which takes place 
mostly within the Human Domain. One can, in some instances, “rent a warlord,” bribe 
individuals, or pay for compliance. However, the USASOC Planner’s Handbook cites 
scholarship showing that, “material benefits do not effectively buy allies,” even if, 
material benefits “can cement alliances of interest after their formation.”277 Effective 
alliances must be established, at best with good will, at least with a measure of legitimacy 
and trust. Thus, the USASOC Theory of Special Operations seems to support this thesis’s 
contention that the SF Ethic impacts effectiveness, in this case, due to enhancing 
physical, cognitive, and moral access. 
2. Member Well-Being Effectiveness 
Supporting the Hill-McCaskey “member well-being” conception of effectiveness 
is the direct guidance of ARSOF senior leaders. “The number one guiding direction from 
the Chairman is to ensure the success of our nation’s warfighting forces by preserving 
unit readiness, cohesion, and morale.”278 Likewise, ADRP 1 asserts that Army leaders 
have a moral obligation based on the office they hold “to care for the people and 
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resources entrusted to them by the American people.”279 Or as ARSOF Next puts it, “As 
long as the force remains true to its first principles: having the right people, aggregated 
into amazing teams, rallied behind a unique commitment to the nation, it will 
succeed.”280 Thus, member well-being is an end in itself as well as a measure of 
effectiveness; it correlates with achieving organizational goals or missions, which also 
defines effectiveness.  
3. Overview of Trust 
Before considering the two types of trust introduced in Chapter I—relational 
influence and reputation—we will review ways in which aspects of trust apply to both 
explanations: how trust broadly seems to impact effectiveness. ADRP 1 calls trust, “the 
bedrock of our profession.”281 As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin 
Dempsey said, “On the foundation of trust, we will overcome any challenge that we 
confront in the future.”282 Likewise, Admiral McRaven avers, “Success in the human 
domain will depend upon understanding it and establishing trust to prevail in population-
centric strategies or struggles.”283 Furthermore, “The tactical and strategic levels of war 
are very close in irregular warfare.”284 This being the case, individual moral decisions 
often hold greater strategic or operational weight for SF than for conventional forces, in 
terms of their impact on national security, hence the importance of endogenous and 
exogenous trust for the unit to be effective. Senior conventional and SOF leaders agree 
that trust is vital for organizational effectiveness.  
Additionally, several of the SOF Imperatives seem to relate directly to preserving 
both types of trust. These include recognizing the political implications; considering 
long-term effects; facilitating interagency activity; ensuring legitimacy and credibility of 
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special operations; anticipating and controlling psychological effects; and ensuring long-
term sustainability. Ethical mistakes (breaches of trust) threaten to upend each of these 
Imperatives.  
Last, the operational need for autonomy seems to relate to both trust types. 
Autonomy is a normative ethical value, a SOF unit characteristic, an organizational 
theory driver of commitment, and an attitudinal aspect of professionalism. Autonomy is 
made possible by trust. The irregular warfare environment is one in which ODAs 
operate independently and make decisions autonomously because “institutions face a 
severe limit in their ability to exert control over distance.”285 SF soldiers are must work 
autonomously due to the isolated and “low visibility” environment in which they operate. 
“Low-signature operations,” by nature, limit communication and virtually prohibit direct 
oversight of the operator or team by the higher unit, for example. However, the ARSOF 
Operating Concept calls such low-signature operations “the defining hallmark of Special 
Operations” in the future operating environment.286 Thus, both the physical and task 
environments demand “unsupervised predictability of soldier conduct,” which is, “the 
goal of battlefield ethics.”287 ARSOF Next states, “To be able to send an element, 
sometimes as small as a single Soldier, to a foreign country representing not only the 
regiment but in some instances the United States Government without worry is a 
significant characteristic of our force today.”288 Given the above factors, it follows that 
the SF Ethic currently has a positive impact on SF effectiveness via autonomy. 
Furthermore, ARSOF Next suggests that autonomy enhances effectiveness directly 
and via improved efficiency. “When we empower the individual, the expert and the 
lowest-tactical-formations and we let people run because we trust them to do the right 
thing, we exponentially increase the speed and effectiveness of our forces and 
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operations.”289 The essential element here (in addition to competence) is “doing the right 
thing,” that is, ethical behavior. Thus, ARSOF seems to fully support the notion that 
effectiveness follows from ethical behavior.  
Having considered how trust broadly impacts effectiveness, we now cover in 
more detail the two trust-related explanations—relational influence (endogenous trust) 
and reputation (exogenous trust)—for why ethical behavior seems to lead to 
organizational effectiveness. 
4. Trust: Relational Influence and Rapport 
The Human Domain is where SF will succeed or fail, and The ARSOF Operating 
Concept recognizes trust as “the glue of every human relationship.”290 Accordingly, 
ARSOF 2022 notes that the similarity between SF’s FID, COIN, and UW missions or 
capabilities is that “they cultivate relationships with partner forces and seek shared 
security interests.”291 As discussed in Chapter I, acting ethically seems to lead to 
organizational effectiveness because acting ethically preserves the relational influence, 
which impacts SF effectiveness in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational (JIIM) environment. Acting ethically seems to preserve endogenous trust. 
Examples of relationships in which relational influence seems to be essential might 
include the Geographic combatant Commander (GCC) to SOF elements operating in the 
GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR);  AOB commander to his ODA team leaders; ODA 
team leaders to ODA members; and an ODA to its partner or proxy forces.  
An important aspect of relational influence is rapport. Rapport, in SF doctrine is 
“a harmonious or sympathetic relation or connection,” that is, “a relationship between 
people in terms of mutual trust, understanding, and respect.”292 While command 
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authority may represent traditional or legal power (in terms of influence over the 
behavior of others), in SF the complex task environment and adhocratic, professional 
bureaucratic structure make rapport (even within vertical relationships) important. SF 
doctrine emphasizes that, “interpersonal relations are key to the successes experienced 
by Special Forces in the field.”293 The USASOC Planner’s Handbook likewise avers that 
war is a “collective human endeavor” requiring cooperation and rapport to respond 
effectively under “the most trying of circumstances.”294  
Effectiveness is thus a function, in large part of enduring partnerships and 
relationships sustained by good rapport. USASOC 2035 strongly concurs with this 
assertion noting, “The SOF network of personnel, assets, and international partnerships 
represents the means to obtain early understanding of emerging local, regional, and 
transregional threats and opportunities for advancing U.S. objectives…[and] to influence 
outcomes in all campaign phases.”295 Such improved situational awareness and ability to 
influence emergent events thus appear to be largely functions of human relationships. 
Likewise, SF’s “culturally astute means” of accessing populations engenders their 
essential support for (or cooperation with) our cause and also demonstrates a respect for 
others in a Kantian sense.296 As USASOC notes, “special operations forces cannot 
dominate irregular campaigns without the willing support of the indigenous people. The 
people must willingly agree to the strategic end state that the intervening power desires. 
Otherwise, the campaign will fail. The fighting is a subordinate element of the political 
movement.”297 Once again we see that for both pragmatic and intrinsic reasons, respect 
for persons is an integral part of the SF Ethic. Overall, building trust-based rapport 
(through ethical behavior) seems to sustain JIIM relationships and relational influence 
that correlates with effectiveness. 
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5. Trust: Reputation and Perceived Legitimacy 
Next, acting ethically seems to lead to organizational effectiveness because acting 
ethically preserves the reputation of the organization, which influences effectiveness. In 
other words, sustaining the SF reputation preserves exogenous trust. I take reputation to 
be here roughly synonymous with perceived legitimacy and credibility. The more those 
outside the SF organization see SF as legitimate or credible, the more SF will have 
success in building coalitions, the latter being a vital component of irregular warfare. 
Operating in the Human Domain requires SF to have support from the 
international community, the local indigenous community in which they operate, and the 
American public.298 Social scientists and SOF doctrine seem to agree on this point. 
Management professor Jennifer Palthe asserts that, “as subsystems of a wider social 
system, [all organizations] depend on the acceptance of the society in which they 
operate” to achieve organizational goals.299 Similarly, FM 3–05.20 calls legitimacy “the 
most crucial factor” in sustaining popular support.300 Thus, societal perception and 
legitimacy seem to be connected to effectiveness in the Human Domain.  
In the battle for perceptions, both the disciplined individual behavior of operators 
and the legitimacy of the cause itself seem to correlate with positive perceptions. This 
observation seems to align roughly with jus in bello and jus ad bellum laws of Just War 
Theory, respectively. In the first case, “highly disciplined individuals” are a requirement 
in SF because both their personal conduct and their methods of mission accomplishment 
are under observation. The USASOC Planner’s Handbook suggests that, “behavior [of SF 
soldiers] both on duty and off, may have profound effects on their mission 
accomplishment.”301 Whether it be an alcohol-related incident during a JCET or a lack 
fire discrimination in combat—instances of individuals failing to exercise ethical 
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judgment tarnish the unit’s reputation and give the enemy an advantage in building his 
coalition and discrediting the friendly one. However, SF actions that are perceived as 
ethical preserve legitimacy and moral access, allowing successful coalition building and 
political warfare, both measures of effectiveness in irregular warfare. Both also align with 
the first and third Pillars of ARSOF Capability: (1) an Indigenous Approach to 
Operations and (3) Developing Understanding and Wielding Influence. 
In the second case, the legitimacy of the cause, ADRP 3–05 emphasizes that 
perceived legitimacy is also based on the “morality of, and justification for, the actions 
undertaken.”302 SF cannot expect to preserve its legitimacy, influence, and reputation if it 
is fighting for an unjust cause. Again, we might cite the counterexample of insurgents 
defeated in Iraq in 2007—despite OIF being highly problematic in terms of the justice of 
the cause. However, this is again an example of success despite ethical problems rather 
than strong evidence that ethics are unimportant. It was the legitimacy of the cause of the 
Sunni militias of the Anbar Awakening that was in large part responsible for an effective 
response against AQI. Accordingly, missions that are of “obvious national or 
humanitarian interest”—such as the Sons of Iraq—strengthen the perception that the 
cause is legitimate.303 Thus, when deciding on a mission, SF and national leaders 
demonstrate prudence by carefully considering the military necessity, objective ethical 
considerations, and expected public perception of an action.  
Since it is the perception of legitimacy, rather than legitimacy itself, that 
correlates with popular support, U.S. forces, including SF, must effectively communicate 
their legitimate intent to the populace. Such communication, according to ADRP 3–05, is 
“critical to establishing and maintaining legitimacy.”304 This includes communicating 
how the benefit of military action outweighs the risk to American lives and the lives of 
those who might suffer in war.  
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On the issue of legitimacy, ADRP 1 seems to advocate deontological principles, 
e.g. “we cannot violate the rights of others” while pointing out the consequentialist 
reasons for doing so: to “maintain legitimacy as a profession, the trust of the American 
people, and the respect of the international community.”305 If we should protect others’ 
rights because it will maintain our own perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the public, 
such thinking is consequentialist. Kant would call this an “if-then” hypothetical 
imperative, rather than a categorical one: if we want X, then do Y to get it.306 To appeal 
strictly to deontological norms, in contrast, we would simply assert, “we cannot violate 
the rights of others” because it is categorically the right thing to do.307 
Regardless, it seems unrealistic to deny that the SF Ethic contains underlying 
consequentialist reasoning. The ubiquity of outcome-based reasons for moral decision-
making makes this apparent. However, we can likewise reasonably argue that 
deontological reasons (e.g., the importance of protecting human lives and honestly 
communicating intent) are part of the Ethic since they are the norms that seem to be 
“legitimate” in the first place.  
In this section, I have considered four conceptions of how the SF Ethic seems to 
impact organizational effectiveness: (1) the USASOC Theory of Special Operations, (2) 
member well-being, (3) relational influence, and (4) reputation. Each of these four 
conceptions of the SF Ethic-effectiveness link has offered inductive evidence that, taken 
collectively, seems to show a strong positive relationship between the SF Ethic and 
effectiveness.  
Having reflected on these trust-based conceptions of how the SF Ethic leads to 
effectiveness, we will now discuss how a professional SF operator might approach 
navigating the environmental ambiguity and complexity that this thesis has described. To 
do so, we consider the example of the statesman trying to balance or decide between 
political realist and idealist concerns. 
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D. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND STATESMANSHIP 
The Special Forces soldier is the true embodiment of the term “soldier 
statesman,” for he is the soldier and statesman of our time. 
— President John F. Kennedy308 
1. Introduction 
This section presents an argument that the broad normative principles of 
international behavior for the statesman—including principles for covert operations and 
other operations legally defined as “low-intensity conflict”—are in large part analogous 
to the principles the SF operator will need to employ, perhaps on a smaller scale. I argue 
that the analogy of statesman to SF leader is both strong (in the sense that there exist 
important commonalities that lend the analogy validity) and useful (the analogy provides 
insights about the implications of SF values and behavior on effectiveness). I also argue 
that various modes of operating under specific moral frameworks will have similar results 
and implications for Special Operators as for Statesmen, thereby making use of the more 
robust scholarship that exists about the latter than the former. 
Specifically, this case study will consider the arguments for political realism and 
idealism, with the idea that these arguments will apply to the discussion of the 
consequentialist - non-consequentialist dichotomy that is at the heart of this thesis. The 
impacts on effectiveness of adopting one or the other, for a statesman, I argue will be 
similar to the impacts adopting one or the other mode of normative thinking will have on 
the Regiment’s effectiveness. Thus, we can make use of the case of statesmen to make 
predictions about how the SF Ethic will impact effectiveness.  
If we consider the definition of “Statesman” to be “involv[ing]…an ability to act 
competently and confidently in the world without damaging the integrity of a nation’s 
character and principles,” at first glance such a definition applies to the SF operator. SF 
operators are essentially statesmen in the Aristotelian sense that they must act prudently 
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on behalf of the state.309 Sometimes called “warrior diplomats,” SF soldiers appreciate 
“the political aspects of their operational environment” and can articulate U.S. policies, 
goals, and objectives in ways that convince foreign counterparts to support them.310 The 
USASOC Planner’s Handbook notes that, “the proximity of the strategic and tactical 
levels in irregular war makes the special operators political operatives because they are 
directly affecting the strategic level of actors in the irregular war.”311 SF personnel are 
more like statesmen than conventional forces due to the autonomous nature of the SF 
mission and the degree of leeway, autonomy, or discretion they have in determining the 
method, the ‘how’ of mission accomplishment.  
While differences may exist in authorization vs implementation in the jus ad 
bellum versus jus in bello sense, both statesmen and SF soldiers use similar political 
tools. For example, International Politics professors Alberto Coll and Richard Schultz 
define covert action as “employed to influence politics and events in another country 
without revealing one’s involvement or at least while maintaining plausible 
deniability.”312  They suggest that covert action is becoming increasingly difficult to 
apply as an instrument of statecraft in the modern global environment. Similarly, FM 3–
05.20 (2001) says, “SF conducts its operation in either an overt, low-visibility, covert, or 
clandestine manner,” and FM 3–05 emphasizes that SF operations “are typically low 
visibility or clandestine.”313 Types of covert action include Propaganda, Political action, 
Paramilitary assistance, Coup d’état, Secret intelligence support—providing training to a 
foreign leader to help him preserve his regime.314 That each of these types of covert 
action potentially applies to an SF mission-set lends additional credence to the 
applicability of statesmanship to SF.  
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Most notably, Unconventional Warfare (UW), according to army doctrine, is “the 
core SF mission,” “at the core of ten principal Special Forces tasks.”315 In fact, FM 3–
05.20 notes that, “SF represents the U.S. Army’s only unconventional warfare (UW) 
capability.”316 Unconventional warfare is defined as “activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”317 UW operations can also be conducted with a more limited 
scope to “pressure an adversary,” typically in an environment “characterized by very high 
political sensitivity and very low visibility of U.S. involvement.” Any of these operations 
not conducted in an aboveboard manner possess both the possible benefits and the 
inherent risks of political realist polices, discussed next.318 
2. Political Realism 
Every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by 
being necessary. 
—Nathan Hale, inscribed at CIA Headquarters319 
Prior to being hanged in 1776 for spying on the British, Nathan Hale spoke the 
above words, making implicit his belief that ends justify means in defense of one’s 
nation. This is a consequentialist justification, that the right action is the one calculated to 
result in maximal national power or benefit. Political realism is not without rational 
defense. There are several reasons we might think that an (amoral) political realist 
strategy might contribute to effectiveness.  
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First, we might say that covert or clandestine action against an enemy state is a 
legitimate and effective tool of policy in a Clausewitzian sense—even if the enemy 
government is a “legitimate” one. Such a description of covert action aligns with the 
ostensibly-pragmatic realist notion that actions are (morally) justified if they support 
national interests because international politics are “a sphere without justice.”320 Realism 
argues that imposing moral restrictions on ourselves, when our enemies do not, creates a 
power imbalance in which the enemy has a significant advantage since they presumably 
have more options. Furthermore, a realist might ask, what is the harm in gaining a 
strategic advantage through underhanded means—say by a covert action that U.S. 
civilians or perhaps congress would not approve—if it is never discovered? 
Along these lines, Lt. General James Doolittle (of Doolittle raid fame) codified 
the U.S. national realist position during the Cold War with the “Doolittle Standard,” 
advocating that “fair play must be reconsidered.”321 The types of activities Doolittle 
suggested the U.S. should be proficient in included “Paramilitary support to foreign 
governments, paramilitary special operations…counterterrorism and counter-narcotics,” 
subversion, sabotage, and destruction of our enemies “by clever, more sophisticated, and 
more effective methods than those used against us.”322 Here he may as well have been 
describing the Special Forces Regiment by name as the description is apt. Doolittle 
likewise suggested, “the American people should be acquainted with, understand, and 
support this [he conceded] fundamentally repugnant policy.”323 The SF soldier-statesman 
finds himself in a similar dilemma. Given the commander’s intent and broad leeway to 
act within it, should he not use underhanded means to gain advantage? Can SOF afford 
not to be Machiavellian in “an increasingly disordered world that is punctuated by 
competitors capitalizing on hybrid-warfare capabilities?”324 Certainly, the insurgents, 
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terrorists, and narco-trafficker’s that the operator is up against will use unethical means in 
pursuit of often unethical causes.  
Having considered some of the potential benefits of political realism, we now turn 
to look at how an amoralist strategy might be detrimental to effectiveness. Political 
realism (as a high risk for loss of legitimacy), seems to fail on pragmatic—if not moral 
grounds. From a pragmatic view, covert action can compromise diplomacy in other areas, 
and put at jeopardy the advantage the U.S. now enjoys that is a function of its reputation. 
If we violate these principles we can no longer impugn others for such violations without 
hypocrisy. Likewise SF units operating abroad must equally consider how their actions 
might be viewed in terms of U.S. reputation since these units are U.S. representatives. 
Non-consequentialist concerns notwithstanding, the consequentialist or even 
Machiavellian problems with realism might be summed up: 
With respect to large-scale combat operations, the presence of increased 
globalization, international media, and the prevalence of cellular hand-
held media devices amplify the negative utilitarian consequences of acting 
immorally. In other words, organizational military ethics may not be 
morally based—but a desire to accomplish the mission and win the war 
drives the ethics into a de facto synchronization with Revisionist’s Jus in 
Bello morals to guarantee success.325 
Thus, while this does not comment on the status of the foundation of military 
ethics, it provides good reasons why political realism may not be pragmatic or utilitarian, 
despite the claims to the contrary of realism’s proponents.  
Former CIA official Ralph McGhee argues that covert action “helped destroy 
democracy around the world…breed[ing] disrespect for the truth…[and] for the rule of 
law [both international and domestic]. Years of hardening in the ugly business…have 
surely taken their toll.”326 The latter concern might be described as an insidious “ethical 
fading” in which making morally questionable choices leads to more and more ethically 
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dubious behavior over time. This might be considered the inverse of the positive 
habituation Aristotle describes.327 
This concern applies equally to SOF soldiers who work to accomplish the mission 
in the “grey zone.” Could it be that the activities in which SF is involved likewise “take 
their toll” on members of the community or the organization as a whole, or is this 
alarmism? A number of incidents with the elite SEAL Team Six have recently 
highlighted this risk.328 SF is not without its own examples.329 I argue in the Emergency 
Department case study (Appendix B) that ethical fading is a threat worth addressing 
within SF Regiment.  
The case study found that tragic or significant events can elicit strong emotions 
that “can focus people into creating a system that works.”330 However, it seems plausible 
that the extended time horizon of most of SF missions (FID, UW, COIN) may degrade 
the urgency of moral emotions. Since “professional values are defended and maintained 
or lost” in interactions in organizational contexts, if regular events fail to cross the 
threshold of sufficient moral emotion to elicit a “values maintenance work” response, 
suboptimal ethical norms may be established like a frog slowly boiled.331 Moreover, SF 
norms that emphasize “finding a way” or “getting it done” (potentially in a manner that 
conflicts with the SF Ethic, including the Army Ethic) might act as an additional catalyst 
for ethical fading. A reasonable recommendation seems to be that, for the SF 
organization to stay effective, it should remain aware of the possibility of “ethical fading” 
and deliberately track “artifacts” that might indicate an increasing trend toward it. 
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In sum, political realism seems to fail on both pragmatic or consequentialist and 
non-consequentialist or deontic grounds. Given the real threat that it poses to legitimacy, 
the notion that realism might contribute to effectiveness, even given the “benefits” 
mentioned, is dubious at best. “Breeding disrespect” for truth and the rule of law seems to 
be a recipe for ethical fading. Furthermore, the notion that, in the international political 
sphere, there exists some separate version of moral norms seems likewise implausible. 
Having considered one end of the spectrum, we now consider its opposite: idealism. 
3. Idealism 
According to Coll and Shultz, the moral virtues of the statesman are based in the 
traditions of the Greeks and American founding documents. From the Greek tradition, the 
moral virtues of the effective statesman include justice, moderation, liberality, honor, and 
proper ambition, and from America’s founders the principles: equality, inalienable 
rights, and self-determination.332 These values are inexorably the groundwork upon 
which the SF values lie. To diverge from them within the SF Regiment’s own culture 
would be logically incoherent in the sense that Kant describes in his first formulation of 
the categorical imperative.333 Idealism rejects basing decisions on calculated outcomes 
but instead demands that we perform the actions that our values demand, irrespective of 
the outcome. The concern with idealism is that its moral rigidity is impractical. Kant even 
seems to suggest that doing what is prudent lacks moral weight. He says, “prudence… 
cannot command at all, i.e., cannot exhibit actions objectively as practically necessary; 
they are sooner taken as advisings than as commands of reason.”334 According to Kant 
then, “the precept of prudence is always hypothetical; the action is commanded not 
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absolutely but only as a means to another aim.”335 Thus, Kant always considers prudence 
instrumental. Having considered the stringency of idealism, we now consider prudence.  
4. Prudence: Walking the Line between Realism and Idealism 
Virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim and prudence 
that of the means toward it. 
 — Aristotle, Book VI of The Ethics336 
We have thus considered political realism and idealism and found them to be 
suboptimal in terms of realizing effectiveness for both the statesman and the soldier-
statesman. We now consider this thesis’ contention that aretaic prudence might offer a 
means to be effective without sacrificing morals that seem to be both practical and of 
intrinsic value. Accordingly, the prudent person, herein defined, takes into account both 
realist and idealist considerations.  
Like the idealist, the prudent statesman or soldier-statesman uses universal moral 
principles to guide his or her actions, including values we hold as a nation. For example 
the prudent soldier-statesman considers idealist values such as those of the self-evident 
truth of “natural rights” and equality found in the Declaration of Independence. This 
respect for persons reflects Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative—
that persons are ends in themselves and have inherent rather than instrumental value. We 
see this value codified in the first SOF Truth: “Humans are more important than 
hardware.” This “Truth” reflects both the intrinsic worth of people as well as the 
pragmatic truth that effective people and relationships are preeminent requirements for 
mission accomplishment. 
Like the realist, however, a good statesman has the aretaic prudential traits 
“practical intelligence, experience, and knowledge of the particular characteristics of his 
regime and the world around it.”337 We might encapsulate the latter with the expression, 
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“Understand the operational environment,” the number one and preeminent SOF 
imperative. Overcoming the tension that emerges between these idealist and realist 
concerns is the topic of this section. An example of this tension played out in 2015. 
The Declaration of Independence established that the government exists based on 
the consent of the governed. Thus, American institutions, including the DOD, are subject 
to popular consent. In late 2015, General Joseph Votel as commander of USSOCOM, 
while discussing gender integration, described how the culture of the SOF organization is 
a microcosm of U.S. society at large.338 In this case he argued that equality of 
opportunity is an important American cultural norm that should likewise exist in SOF. 
While Votel’s opinion, which was also shared by many SOF subordinate 
commanders was primarily non-consequentialist (although it included consequentialist 
elements as well), much of the backlash to gender integration from the members of SOF 
has been framed in a consequentialist manner. Specifically, many operators argued that 
the mission, the end, was more important than a duty to individuals, to permit them 
equality. Thus, here we see a clear tension between those who consider pragmatic 
concerns as primary versus those who consider as primary doing “the right thing” for its 
own sake—because they consider it to be “the right thing to do.” The latter argue that the 
consequences are secondary; actions should not mainly be chosen because of the 
outcomes we expect them to affect. 
Consequentialist concerns are not without warrant. The SF Ethic must be practical 
to be effective. Mission success defines effectiveness: “Risk management considers not 
only the potential loss of ARSOF units and equipment but also the risk of adverse effects 
on U.S. diplomatic and political interests if the mission fails.”339 Legitimacy and 
credibility are not simply a function of ethical behavior; they are also a function of 
success. Effectiveness itself lends credibility, which in turn leads to effectiveness, in a 
circular fashion. As many operators are aware, and as General Douglas MacArthur so 
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succinctly put it, “There is no substitute for victory.” One might argue however, that 
sometimes there are substitutes for victory—times in which achieving victory might 
come at too high a (moral) cost.  
Prudence, an Aristotelian virtue, shows promise in helping us respond to this 
debate among other dilemmas.340 According to Aristotle, “Deliberating well is the 
function of a prudent person….[and] the unqualified good deliberation is the sort that 
promotes the unqualified end (i.e., the highest good), while the limited sort correctly 
promotes some limited end.”341 Thus, for Aristotle, the prudent person prioritizes the 
most intrinsic value—over instrumental or perhaps shorter term considerations—when 
deciding on an action. 
For Aristotle, prudence (phronesis) or “good deliberation,” is much like 
“wisdom” (sophia), and is indicative of “intelligent awareness in general.”342 
Accordingly, one might suggest that “wisdom” is a better candidate than “prudence” for 
effectively managing the above tension. But Aristotle makes an important distinction 
between the two virtues. One can be “wise, but not prudent,” in that, “what he knows is 
extraordinary…but useless, because it is not human goods that he looks for.”343 We 
might take from this that, in the pursuit of success in activities that have instrumental 
value or utility, one should not lose sight of the intrinsic final good that is the purpose of 
the instrumental task at hand. If the task threatens what is intrinsically valuable, e.g., the 
dignity of persons, the task or method should probably be reconsidered. 
In addition to keeping the highest ends in mind, if we want to actually obtain 
those ends, Aristotle says the details matter. That is, prudence identifies ones highest duty 
and then uses reason to chart the most expedient course to that end. To chart such a 
course, prudence “requires a grasp of the particulars [that is, contextual details], since 
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this is needed... [to successfully conclude] deliberation.”344 Thus, prudence is about 
understanding “universals” or generalizable principles. But, even more it is about 
“knowledge of particulars, since [prudence] is concerned with action and action is about 
particulars.”345 
These particulars are a function of experience to Aristotle, which he seems to 
mean the study of general principles applied to particular cases. One might thus achieve 
experience by many iterations of (personally) applying universal principles to particular 
instances in practice—so as to be proficient in applying universals to particulars. 
Alternatively, one might gain vicarious understanding or experience by studying many 
cases of universals applied to particular cases.346 
Accordingly, the importance of details or “particulars”—as well as taking the long 
view—seem to align with SOF doctrine. FM 3–05.20 states “SFODAs must look at each 
problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context. They must then 
develop a long-term approach to solving the problem.”347 For example, while unethical 
actions such as indiscriminately detaining civilians to elicit tactical intelligence might be 
effective in the short term, such a policy would almost certainly result in long-term 
failure. Considering the particulars and long-term effects would reveal this mistake. 
By nature of the task environment, operators must do things without public 
knowledge. Thus, Coll and Shultz offer sage advice for statesmen that applies equally to 
SF operators: “Proceed only where there is a good chance that there would be a national 
consensus behind that action if it became known to the public [either during or after the 
operation],” and in a way that does not contradict overt American policy.348 This “test of 
exposure” simulates what actual oversight might provide and serves to restrict those 
actions that might go beyond the bounds of prudence.  
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Prudence for SF entails what today we might call professionalization: cultivating 
an intelligent, trained, and educated force. Aristotle asserts that “Each virtue...requires 
training and rational control of one’s feelings and capacities by prudence.”349 Thus, 
Aristotle seems to describe precisely what organizational theorists have empirically 
validated (as described in Chapter III). Namely, that professionalization includes 
education to make autonomous judgments, at increasingly lower levels, about complex 
problems. With what might be called either prudence or professionalism, FM 3–05 
concludes that “Blending their skills and experience enables Special Forces Soldiers to 
navigate ambiguous environments that affect the political, social, religious, and 
humanitarian aspects of today’s uncertain environments.”350 Overall, SF professionals 
are effective when they are experienced, educated, ethical, and they understand nuance 
and context. We might capture all these attributes under the notion of prudence. As 
Aristotle claims, “Full virtue [of character] cannot be acquired without prudence,” and, in 
fact, “all the virtues…require prudence.”351 
As a final thought we might consider the question, “Is following Kant’s 
deontological ethics, in all reality, impractical or perhaps imprudent?” Kant seems to be 
saying, for example, that OSS-supported partisans in France should not kill their Nazi 
occupiers as part of an insurgency.352 Philosopher Helga Varden analyzes this scenario as 
a critique of Kantian ethics:  
Being a hero is not something anyone can be legally or ethically required 
to do. This is why many of those who took part in the active resistance 
were publicly acknowledged—by means of various national medals of 
honor—as heroes after the war was over. Kant’s account makes perfect 
sense of why we see some actions as heroic, or supererogatory (going 
beyond duty), and others not. As embodied human beings, therefore, we 
can be forced into situations from which there are no morally 
unproblematic exits. That so many of the WWII war heroes later found 
their violence hard to live with is therefore not a symptom of their lack of 
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351 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 98. 
352 SF traces its lineage to the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services.  
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virtuous character, but rather a reflection of their commitment to virtue 
and right—or morality in general—under circumstances where virtuous, 
rightful interaction was coercively deprived them.353 
 This is precisely the position that Green Berets volunteer for—exposure to 
situations in which there may be “no morally unproblematic exits.” This is why the 
public considers them heroes, and perhaps why many of these heroes later struggle with 
PTSD. It is not just bravery shown in battle that makes them heroic; it is the willingness 
to bear the moral weight of their decisions long after they have made them.  
In our democratic society, it is the duty of national and military leaders to “use 
well” the lives of citizens who serve as soldiers and not squander them.354 It is likewise 
the duty of leaders to minimize the harm of those in their charge while completing the 
mission. Accordingly, it seems that national and military leaders have a duty to 
professionalize and educate those who have volunteered to accept the moral burden of 
decision in war. To do so is to justly minimize their injury.  
Professionalization, including the training for ethics, can arguably reduce the 
moral weight operators bear by (1) helping them make the best decision possible, perhaps 
the one that is least morally problematic, and (2) helping them understand why in terms 
ethics, the decision they made was the “lesser of two evils,” thus potentially reducing the 
enduring moral burden. As we would not send a solider into combat today with a 
flintlock rifle, likewise we must make every effort to arm today’s Green Beret with the 
tools he needs to navigate a complex and morally ambiguous operating environment.  
Overall, prudence indeed seems to offer an effectual middle path in responding to 
the tension between adaptability and integrity, consequentialism and non-
consequentialism, and realism and idealism. Navigating this tension using prudence, with 
                                                 
353 Helga Varden, “Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door…One More Time: Kant’s Legal 
Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis,” in Journal of Social Philosophy 41, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 
421. 
354 James Dubik discusses the Jus in bello (not just Jus ad bellum) responsibilities of national and 
military leaders to use well the lives of soldiers in Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory, 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016). 
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dogmatic commitment to neither pole, likely correlates with organizational effectiveness 
in the SF Regiment. 
E. CONCLUSIONS  
Chapter IV has provided a description of what effectiveness means for SF as well 
as an analysis of what Army and SF publications say and imply about the ethics-
effectiveness link. Chapter IV also provided a bifurcated description of trust that 
explained how relational influence and reputation both seem to correlate with 
effectiveness in SF. Chapter IV concluded with a discussion of prudence using the 
illustration of SF as “the embodiment of the ‘soldier statesman.’” This section concluded 
with the idea that professionals can preserve or enhance effectiveness by walking a 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is not the strongest…nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one 
that is most adaptable to change. 
—Charles Darwin355  
This thesis originally proposed two complimentary research questions, one related 
to normative moral philosophy and one related to organizational theory. The first 
question was designed to illuminate the nature of the Special Forces ethical framework—
the SF Ethic. The purpose of the second question was to ascertain the impact of the SF 
ethical framework on the effectiveness of the SF Regiment.  
In answer to the first question, the SF Ethic is a mix of deontology, 
consequentialism, and virtue theory. Deontology is important throughout, but a trend 
toward consequentialism emerges as we consider unconventional methods for which SF 
is known. The answer reveals a tension and source of ambivalence between the first two 
ethical frameworks. However, within the third framework lies the aretaic notion of 
prudence, which seems to offer a “middle path,” helping to resolve the tension and 
potentially bridge the consequentialist-non-consequentialist divide.  
Of interest, the three “most important” ARSOF individual traits (as rated by 
ARSOF soldiers) seemed to align with the three normative theories just described. 
Adaptability seems to align with consequentialism; Professionalism seems to be defined 
in terms that align with prudence; and Integrity aligns with non-consequentialism. This 
thesis concluded that the prudential middle path seems to correlate more with 
effectiveness than either extreme. A strictly Manichaean perspective seems to be 
unpractical and analytically implausible. 
In answer to the second question, ethical behavior seems to positively correlate 
with organizational effectiveness, both as a generalizable principle and also applied to the 
                                                 
355 Leon Megginson, “Lessons from Europe for American Business,” in Southwestern Social Science 
Quarterly 44 no. 1; (1963): 4.  
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case of the Special Forces Regiment. In Chapter I, I provided a linear model to describe 
the SF Ethic - Effectiveness pathway (Figure 1) that depicts the process by which an SF 
soldier operating under the SF Ethic might contribute to effectiveness. Within the SF 
Ethic, values shape the principles that define one’s duties. Then professional and 
prudential judgment—influenced by organizational and operational factors (Chapters III 
and IV, respectively)—informs our decisions. Given sufficient willpower to act 
prudently, the sum of individual actions results in organizational effectiveness. 
To provide essential context for the SF Ethic, Chapter III described the 
environment (complex, unstable), organizational structure (professional-adhocracy), 
human resource flow, and culture. The latter began to depict the process by which ethics 
seems to impact effectiveness via the transitive relationships between ethic and culture 
and culture and effectiveness. 
At the individual level of analysis, commitment, trust, and professionalism 
provide empirical theoretical evidence for the link between the SF Ethic and SF 
Effectiveness. Increased commitment seems to correlate with increased effectiveness in 
SF. Commitment is also associated with identification, internalization, and dedicated 
actions, which all likewise seem to correlate with effectiveness (particularly given the SF 
structure and environment).  
Trust occupies “the central role of dedication and responsibility in commitment.” 
Prior research and the Klein theory both ascribe a “strong” connection between trust and 
commitment. In high-reliability task contexts (such as those in which SF often operates) 
an increase in trust correlated with an increase in performance. Thus, trust, which itself is 
a function of integrity (a deontological trait) correlates with higher performance and thus 
effectiveness. 
Professionalism means to serve as a Green Beret standard bearer. To be effective 
in the FOE requires continual professionalization to make autonomous, sound, mature 
judgments. Operators must have the information, training, education, and authority to act 
adaptively, creatively, and ethically to accomplish the mission. We can expect 
professionalization of the SF Regiment to positively correlate with organizational 
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effectiveness, in part due to the empirical connection between professionalism and 
commitment and in part due to its logical connection to prudence.  
From Chapter III we also see that HR practices that can create commitment bonds 
include a productivity climate, socialization efforts, mentoring programs, flexible work 
hours, and training. Bonuses may convince people to stay but do not correlate with 
volitional dedication. Burnout climate (think “dwell time” and “troop to task” 
considerations), managing by fear, quotas, inappropriate extrinsic rewards, or 
micromanagement are associated with lower commitment and are thus probably 
ineffective or counterproductive for Special Forces soldiers.  
A high level of professional education and rewarding those who pursue continued 
professional education will likely correlate with higher commitment and effectiveness in 
SF. Additionally, leadership behaviors that seem to positively correlate with commitment 
include decentralized command and control (C2), coaching, providing purpose, 
permitting choice, scorekeeping, and inspiring. 
Chapter IV provided additional support for the SF Ethic-effectiveness link, both 
stated in and inferred from Army and SF publications. As it does in organizational theory, 
here trust seems to provide a clear mediating link between the SF Ethic and effectiveness. 
By way of preserving and building trust, the SF Ethic improves effectiveness. Senior 
conventional and SOF leaders agree that trust is vital for organizational effectiveness. 
Ethical mistakes (breaches of trust), however, threaten to upend several of the SOF 
imperatives and thus negatively impact effectiveness. Additionally, autonomy—a 
normative ethical value, a SOF unit characteristic, an organizational theory driver of 
commitment, and an attitudinal aspect of professionalism—is made possible by trust. 
Reputation and relational influence factors are likewise related to trust, and they 
sustain perceived legitimacy and rapport, respectively. One can also consider them 
mediating factors between the ethical behavior and organizational effectiveness. 
According to SF doctrine, legitimacy is “the most crucial factor in developing and 
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maintaining domestic and international support.”356 This support allows SF to be 
effective. Likewise, legitimacy is sustained through ethical behavior. For example, ADRP 
1 states, “If we are to maintain legitimacy as a profession…we cannot violate the rights 
of others.”357 Similarly, building rapport through ethical behavior seems to sustain JIIM 
relationships and relational influence that correlates with effectiveness. 
Chapter IV also identified the apparent weaknesses in idealism and realism, 
namely that idealism seems to be impractical, and realism neither ethical nor practical. 
Chapter IV uses an illustration of the SF soldier-statesman to show how a professional 
might use aretaic prudence to help resolve the tension between adaptability and integrity, 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism, and realism and idealism.  
SF professionals can likely help preserve or enhance the effectiveness of the SF 
Regiment by walking a middle path that is both principled and practical, that makes SF 
both trusted and effective. This aligns with the U.S. founding fathers’ admonition for 
statesmen to reject “absolute adherence to, nor the complete avoidance of, our values” 
and to “refrain from the unlimited pursuit of abstract doctrines in whatever form they 
take.”358 Accordingly, prudence is a balanced and informed judgment. It is deciding the 
right course of action based on “good deliberation” and consideration through a grasp of 
the particulars—contextual details. Prudence entails balancing higher normative concepts 
with getting good results and “adjusting or applying universal moral virtues to particular 
situations.”359 Prudence is a means toward virtuous ends. 
As the Regiment professionalizes and decentralizes, it puts the burden of moral 
responsibility on SF operators. Thus, operators should be afforded every possible 
advantage in navigating the moral terrain. Accordingly, I recommend (1) synthesizing 
and organizing the various conceptions of values, principles, attributes, characteristics, 
traits etc., to provides a sense of hierarchy and priority as well as common definitions 
                                                 
356 U.S. Dept. of Defense, FM 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, 1–21. 
357 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADRP 1 The Army Profession, 3–4. 
358 Coll et al., Legal and Moral Constraints of Low-Intensity Conflict, 344. 
359 Ibid., 340. 
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across doctrinal sources. (2) I also recommend SF develop a semi-algorithmic process 
guide to help operators systematically think through moral dilemmas. I would 
recommend it incorporate the reorganized terms, describe the moral “tension” inherent in 
the SF Ethic, and discuss ways to resolve the tension, including prudence. (3) Last, I 
recommend adding an ethics training block to the SFQC as this will likely contribute to 
organizational effectiveness by helping to professionalize the force.   
The notion that the SF ethical framework should be organized more coherently is 
supported by the operational need to act decisively under ambiguous circumstances. 
Aristotle implies that a puzzle with paradoxical results precludes action because it cannot 
be solved, and what to do is indeterminate.360 However, Bertrand Russell says, “To teach 
how to live without certainty and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation is perhaps the 
chief thing that philosophy in our age can still do for those who study it.”361 Accordingly, 
SF officers who can articulate their moral reasoning, both to themselves and others, will 
presumably act more swiftly, more correctly, and perhaps more resolutely.  
ARSOF Next has noted that “to counter today’s increasingly ideologically based 
threats, ARSOF must understand...who it is as an organization. This self-knowledge and 
understanding becomes ARSOF’s greatest weapon.”362 Accordingly, it is vital for the SF 
Regiment and its soldiers to understand the Regiment’s philosophical underpinnings—
our values, principles, and norms—since judgments, decisions, and actions largely flow 
from them. We should want to understand our normative underpinnings to win, to be 
effective, to optimize. But, more importantly, understanding the basis of objective moral 
decision-making is itself intrinsically valuable.  
Furthermore, if what we do does not align with our professed values, either our 
routines or values need to change. It is a leader’s responsibility to identify and resolve 
such value-routine misalignments rather than simply punishing those who (a) make 
                                                 
360 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 101.  
361 Anders Österling, “Award Ceremony Speech: The Nobel Prize in Literature 1950,” Swedish 
Academy, 1950. 
362 USASOC, “ARSOF Next,” 5. 
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mistakes while trying to navigate misalignment (b) violate routines in favor of values or 
(c) violate values in favor of routines. 
According to the USASOC Planner’s Handbook, “In terms of one’s knowledge 
structure and framing, more disaggregated operations require unorthodox situation 
framing, often necessitating creative and unique views of situations.”363 Likewise, this 
thesis’ description of the structure of the SF Ethic as it impacts effectiveness, has required 
some “unorthodox framing.” While unique, my approach seems to align with the 
USASOC operational art and design method in the sense that thesis has assumed “a more 
anthropological approach that takes into account relational, indeterminate, and complex 
causality” and has tried to provide “rich description and narrative.”364 There is some 
precedent to this as even the USASOC Planner’s Handbook suggests that “complex 
problems...might be best resolved though...using a range of multidisciplinary 
approaches.”365 
As Miner avers, “knowledge of the dynamics of organizations and their capacity 
to predict the occurrence of particular structures and processes would seem to offer the 
possibility of engineering a situation to maximize organizational effectiveness.”366 I hope 
that the preceding schemata have contributed to that knowledge base and will allow SF 
leaders to make better organizational design decisions, particularly those regarding SF 
ethical and cultural indoctrination. The analysis, conclusions, and recommendations of 
this research, while hopefully internally consistent, only follow under the assumption that 
the philosophical and organizational theory tools used are sufficient to answer the 
question. If that assumption holds, than my conclusions likewise have merit. 
                                                 
363 USASOC Planner’s Handbook,  VI-3. The handbook describes “disaggregated operations” as “how 
SOF act relatively autonomous, independent of the conventional force – not requiring traditional forms of 
command and control and planning methods more associated with centralized or horizontal (top-down) 
decision making.” 
364 Ibid. The Handbook portrays these factors as important to describing the Human Domain. 
365 Ibid., VIII-5. 
366 John B. Miner, “On the Nature of Theory.” 4. 
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The Special Forces Regiment, conducting its irregular warfare mission, will be 
essential to U.S. national security in the coming decades. An important and interesting 
note is that the use of indigenous or proxy forces does not necessarily entail 
consequentialism. As noted in Chapter II, if a Green Beret is willing to shed his own 
blood with a partner force in the pursuit of common objectives, the idea that the SF 
soldier is using his partner as a mere means seems implausible. Green Berets do not see 
others as mere means to an end. Rather, irregular warfare, according to USASOC “is 
ultimately about the choices of individuals and the future that they desire.”367 The 
existence of a bond of trust between international partners implies that both sides share 
mutual respect. In alignment with Kantian deontology, they possess the good will.  
The indigenous approach is, “empowering populations that live in the region.”368 
If our national objectives align with what is morally right, then our military strategies that 
flow from them can likewise be just. Then, by empowering and providing autonomy to 
those who will not take it from others, SF will respect people as ends in and of 
themselves and truly free the oppressed. 
Interesting to note is a dichotomous thread that runs through this thesis. I have 
already described the Idealism—Realism, Non-Consequentialism—Consequentialism, 
and Integrity—Adaptability parallel bifurcations. But other divisions have appeared too, 
and they seem to align with or be reminiscent of the dualism between light and dark, 
good and evil, or yin and yang. The SOCM divides its individual attributes between two 
categories: Character and Intellect. These categories and the traits that lie within them 
roughly align with Non-Consequentialism and Consequentialism, duty and pragmatism, 
or moral rigidity and flexibility. Surprisingly, even the organizational structure 
professional bureaucracy–adhocracy reflects order and chaos, authority and anarchy. At 
its core, this thesis attempts to synthesize philosophy and science, rationalism and 
empiricism. Whether this seemingly recurrent dualism has some sort of metaphysical 
significance, I leave to the reader to decide.  
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APPENDIX A.  KOHLBERG’S THEORY OF MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Lending further support to the commitment model by Klein et al., and specifically 
to the notion that internalized moral norms are a major source of commitment for SF 
members, is the Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (Figure 14). SF members are 
often noted for their “maturity.” Given the need to operate autonomously, it follows that 
SF would select for and foster a culture that aligns with the sixth stage of Kohlberg’s 
moral development, that is, “principled conscience”: doing right for its own sake.369  
Arguably, stage six is the most resistant to moral failing since it seems to be the 
least self-interested or egoistic. According to Richard Daft, only a few people reach the 
highest level of moral development on the Kohlberg scale.370 Assuming members 
consider the organization an ethical one, it follows that a member’s score on the scale 
would positively correlate with his commitment to the organization. An interesting caveat 
here is that we would expect to see less commitment from a stage 6 individual who 
deems his team to be corrupt. 
A strict theory x leader might make a Machiavellian appeal to the idea that to 
secure compliance “it is better to be feared than loved,” that carrots and sticks best 
achieve results. However, because of the autonomous environment in which SF operates, 
commitment based in “higher” moral reasoning and empowerment is almost certainly 
more effective than extrinsic rewards and punishments alone. Thus, SF intelligence 
testing, including testing for abstract reasoning (that permits higher moral reasoning) is 
both in keeping with the more sophisticated moral reasoning that exists in the SF Ethic 
and seems empirically relate to organizational effectiveness. 
                                                 
369 Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development loosely correspond to Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive 
Development in which “Formal Operations” (e.g., abstract logic and theoretical reasoning) become possible 
at the most advanced stage. (https://www.psychologynoteshq.com/kohlbergstheory/) Paiget seems to 
provide empirical support for the meta-ethical position that objective morals can be grounded in abstract 
objects (e.g., proposition, concepts). To do so, clearly one would have to possess the cognitive faculties and 
development to employ effectively abstract logic and reasoning.   




Figure 14.  Kohlberg Scale of Moral Development.371 
  
                                                 
371 Source: https://i.pinimg.com/originals/7c/66/8b/7c668bf9726c0f015108efae20126bfc.jpg. 
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APPENDIX B.  CASE STUDY: MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL 
VALUES IN THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
1. Generalizability and Utility of the Case 
Having defined the military occupation and particularly the SF branch as a 
profession, I find a real possibility exists that lessons from other professions are be 
insightful to the extent the professions share common traits. Again, because of the limits 
of scholarship, or more importantly, the more robust scholarship that has addressed other 
professions, we now turn to this academic study of ethics in a non-military setting. The 
medical profession, and specifically, the Emergency Department (ED), provides such a 
case. This is because it addresses maintaining values and morals of a profession that 
seems to share useful similarities to the SF Regiment. This case also lends additional 
empiricism to an ideologically grounded inquiry.372 
The case itself enumerates a series of conditions for generalizability of the 
relationships it discovered (discussed below). One condition they specify is actors being 
closely committed to the values of the institution. Specifically, “commitment is necessary 
to elicit moral emotions of sufficient strength to motivate action.”373 SF operators are 
selected for and demonstrate such commitment. The authors note that “Rather than 
behaving like the self-interested experts portrayed in many prior studies (Brint, 1994), the 
specialists in our study were fundamentally people who were committed to a core 
professional value and reflective about its maintenance in their everyday work.” 
Likewise, SF selects for and socializes such conscientiousness in its organization 
members, making this case particularly relevant.  
Also, both organizations operate in resource-constrained organizational 
environments. Next, member decisions in both are made quickly and are weighty, often 
directly related to life and death—or strategic impact in the case of SF. As the authors 
                                                 
372 The authors note that their analysis “followed established procedures for inductive theory building 
from qualitative data” based on J. Corbin and A. Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research 3rd ed. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008). 
373 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 230. Emphasis mine. 
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describe it, “…our model…reflects the perspective of a specialist engaged in everyday 
work that can be characterized as time-critical, unpredictable, and with high-stakes 
outcomes.”374 
In addition to the guidelines for generalizability of the case’s lessons, other 
important commonalities exist between the ED and the SF Regiment. First, they are both 
professional bureaucracies. That is, they are both professions—which have specific traits 
such as selflessness, self-policing, and providing a service society cannot do for itself. 
They are also flat organizations. Last, they both operate with a higher degree of 
autonomy and authority than other types of organizations. With all these similarities in 
mind, I will suggest that insights from ED will be valuable when applied to SF. I will 
discuss limitations of the comparison at the conclusion of this section.   
On to the significance of the case to this thesis. First, this case demonstrates how 
such organizations maintain their professional values—particularly how relational 
influence (in which members act in the interest of others) is sustained. The functioning of 
relational influence is critical to effectiveness in SF.  
Next, this recent study (2017) demonstrates the importance of values in 
organizational behavior. It provides “strong support for values-based explanations of the 
everyday work of specialists.”375 That is to say, this research supports the contention that, 
despite the claims of earlier research, coordination problems and contests over power and 
status, “offer [only] a superficial account of the conflict between different specialists.” 
These researchers instead assign a much greater role to “deeply held values of the 
profession [that] shape different specialists’ cognitions and emotions during 
interactions.”376 As noted earlier, Wright, Zammuto, and Liesch found only “limited 
support” for the idea that power and ego-based explanations of professional action obtain. 
This insight is also novel in the sense that “…most empirical research, especially in 
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professional settings, has been silent on values-directed institutional work,” work, that I 
contend leads to lesser or greater degrees of effectiveness.377378 
If this conclusion is generalizable, including for SF, it supports my own claim that 
the SF Ethic is a critical variable in the complex system that impacts effectiveness, that 
is, one that, at least qualitatively, appears to have a strong correlation with effectiveness. 
Thus, the role of values in achieving effectiveness has almost certainly been 
underestimated within the organizational theory research community and probably within 
SF organizational leadership.  
This case is about the process of sustaining values in a professional bureaucracy, 
which is one that compartmentalizes activities into areas of specialty expertise.379 We see 
this compartmentalization in SF Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) more than in 
conventional MOS’s. In the former, broad responsibilities are delegated to individuals 
with significant training associated as well as (often) OJT expertise related to their unique 
roles. For example, the 18B Weapons Sergeant manages site security and both partner 
force and ODA tactical training. In conventional forces, many individuals either (a) share 
a common indoctrination and homogenous unit, full of the same MOSs (i.e., an infantry 
platoon) or (b) their MOS training is technical rather than broad in application. The point 
here is to establish that the SF organization is in fact a professional bureaucracy with 
specialties analogous to the ED workers who are the subject of this case. 
2. The Values Maintenance Process 
In general terms, the authors’ major claim was that they uncovered the following 
relationship: moral emotions elicit institutional work which aligns (a) organizational 
processes and individual behaviors with (b) values and effectiveness. Said another way, 
professional values can serve as “…a source of [useful] conflict…a motive for 
professional action inside organizations…[that] mobilizes collective action in 
                                                 
377 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 204. 
378 Ibid., 201. Organizational theorists note that “despite calls for greater explanation of ‘how the 
professions may retain normative value…the puzzle has received little scholarly attention.”  
379 Ibid., 203. 
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institutional maintenance work that changes the organizational practice.”380 To illustrate 
graphically: 
 
professional value-and-practice misalignment → problem perceptions →  
moral emotions → value maintenance work →  
professional value-and-practice alignment → effectiveness 
 
I will now briefly cover each step in process described above and how it applies 
to SF. First, professional values are “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable 
[values], together with the construction of standards [ethics, norms] to which existing 
structures or behaviors can be compared and assessed.”381 Within the ED, the overriding 
professional value to optimize patient well-being is also the key measure of effectiveness. 
Here the SF organization diverges, since in the latter organization, values are 
encapsulated by the SF Ethic, and readiness and mission accomplishment are primary 
measures of effectiveness. In the same way doctors in the study “used language of 
primacy of patient’s need when describing the profession’s values,” SF operators speak 
of the primacy of mission and men.382 While the components of the values and 
effectiveness for the two organizations differ, the process from values to effectiveness is 
the same. 
This study calls proactive specialists the “glue that binds professions, values, and 
specialization together at the micro level of everyday work.”383 Like medical specialists 
do in the ED, SF NCOs and officers use their greater autonomy and decision-making 
authority (than in conventional units) to shape their organizations. They maintain 
professional values, despite the challenges that specialization brings, by making the 
connections between problems and professional values and taking individual and 
collective actions to resolve those problems in ways that sustain the SF Ethic. 
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The two types of problems that emerge are (1) conflicts among individuals 
interpreting the macro organizational values in episodic events, and (2) conflicts between 
systemic practices that conflict with macro organizational values.384 In the case of (1), 
“different specialists who share the same values at the macro level of the profession may 
interpret the profession’s values differently… [in practice] at the micro level.”385 This 
creates “conflict in…interactions at organizational interfaces,” including 
“communication, coordination, and jurisdictional responsibility.”386 
Such conflict might emerge between any of the following entities: (a) Special 
Forces team members’ different specialties (b) ODA and AOB, (c) conventional and 
special operations forces working in a common AOR, or (d) the ODA and other agencies 
or country team. For example, episodic problems can result from “divergent risk 
assessments.” In such cases, one entity might perceive that the other has made the error 
of underestimating the risk of mission failure and thus the latter entity does not seem (to 
the former) to be acting in alignment with the profession’s value of preserving mission 
and men.  
While SF soldiers of different occupational specialties (MOSs) are trained 
separately for their MOS-specific (largely technical) training, situational training is 
conducted with all the SF specialties combined. This largely prevents the formation of 
distinct MOS-based values. For example, the training events SFAS, SUT, SERE, and the 
Robin Sage CULEX include all MOSs combined. Thus, the first challenge (at least 
within the organization) is somewhat mitigated by the structure of the SF training 
pipeline, which cultivates a common values picture from micro to macro.  
The second challenge, however, is one that SF faces in earnest. In the case of (2), 
organizational practices, goals, or requirements (such as budgetary or resource 
constraints, superfluous online training, or suboptimal performance metrics) can 
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inadvertently undermine the values of the profession.387 “Moral emotions elicited by 
systemic problems were experienced within and across groups of specialists and were 
enduring.”388 When specialists in the study observed system problems that elicited 
collective moral emotions, they acted collectively “to maintain the profession’s value by 
changing the [dissonant] organizational practice.”389 
Moral emotions, broadly speaking, are those that a judge or agent feels toward 
the interests or welfare of persons or society (other than himself).390 Thus, the 
organizational theory definition of morality is consistent with morality defined by 
philosophers in that morality has to do with the well-being of conscious creatures.  
Moral emotions are a particular category of emotions elicited by “perceptions of a 
problem [described above] with achieving the profession’s values.391 That is, they 
emerge in response to either violations (negative emotions) or upholding (positive 
emotions) of the moral code. Moral emotions shape “perceptions of the rightness or 
wrongness of particular actions” when evaluated against the profession’s values.392 
Moral emotions can be classifies into four families: self-critical (shame, guilt), other-
condemning (contempt, righteous anger, disgust), other-suffering (empathetic concern, 
compassion), and other-praising (pride, elation).393 This case’s authors cite “a stream of 
literature” which has argued that moral emotions link moral values and behavior.394 
moral values –– (moral emotions) → p(behavior) 
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Moral emotions trigger one of three forms of moral/value maintenance work: (1) 
advocacy, (2) sanctioning, and (3) brokering.395 Maintenance work “entails ‘supporting, 
repairing, or recreating the social mechanisms that ensure compliance’” with the 
regulative, normative, or cultural-cognitive pillars of the profession.396 In the case of the 
normative pillar, maintenance work to maintain the profession’s values can be either 
individual, in the case of addressing episodic problems, or collective, in the case of fixing 
systemic ones.397 “Value misalignment triggered a cognitive and affective process of 
institutional work on the part of the…specialist to solve the problem and maintain 
the…profession’s value.”398  
For such work to occur, individuals must possess a “high cognitive and emotional 
investment in the institutional order… Emotions might be expected to be prominent in 
institutional work directed at maintaining normative values inside organizations because 
someone who is committed to the values of an institution ‘really cares’ about holding 
organizations to those values and standards.”399 As discussed earlier, the crucible of SF 
training selects for and inculcates such an intrinsic sense of concern, which can be 
degraded, though, by asymmetry in values and daily activities.  
Values of the profession (encapsulated by the SF Ethic) translate to interpretation 
and follow the pathway of value maintenance in the everyday work of organization 
members that terminates in degree of effectiveness. 
                                                 
395 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 209. 
396 Ibid., 230. 
397 Ibid., 202. 
398 Ibid., 225. 
399 Ibid., 204. 
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Figure 15.  Value Maintenance Pathway400 
3. Conclusions, Lessons, and Recommendations 
The study speculates that “a relationship may exist between [a] the characteristics 
of a specialist’s everyday work and their cognitive perceptions of particular types of 
problems and [b] the intensity and type of moral emotions elicited in response as a trigger 
for value maintenance work.”401 The study mentions SWAT teams by name as an 
example of another organization (besides the ED) in which tragic or significant events 
that are a function of [a] can elicit strong emotions that “can focus people into creating a 
system that works.”402 
I would in turn speculate that the extended time horizon of most of SF missions 
degrades the urgency of moral emotions. Since “professional values are defended and 
maintained or lost” in interactions in organizational contexts, if regular events fail to 
                                                 
400 Source: Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 229. 
401 Ibid., 234. 
402 Ibid., 218. 
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cross the threshold of sufficient moral emotion to elicit a response, suboptimal norms 
may be established like a frog slowly boiled in a pot.403 Furthermore, the SF practices 
that emphasize “finding a way” or “getting it done” (potentially in a manner that conflicts 
with the SF Ethic, including the Army Ethic) might act as a further catalyst for ethical 
fading. 
Values conflict that elicits institutional work that “arises when specialists are 
expected to perform practices that inadvertently undermine the profession’s values writ 
large,” Such values conflict might not emerge in a way that is sufficient to elicit 
institutional work in some cases. Thus, the risk of deferred institutional work that sustains 
organizational values and effectiveness might be more acute in SF than in, say, a special 
missions unit (SMU) or commander’s response force (CRF).  
To mitigate this risk, the study encourages specialists to be reflective about the 
moral emotions they experience. “Maintaining the values of a profession, which exist at 
the macro level, requires purposive effort by reflective professionals inside organizations 
at the micro level.”404 Such reflection may be particularly important in SF, where the 
extended missions could lead to insidious ethical fading rather than jarring ethical 
conflicts that elicit moral emotions and corresponding action.  
Another practicable lesson was that “Correctly identifying the source [of moral 
emotion] as [an] organizational practice provides the capacity to mobilize collective 
action…to change organizations in ways that better uphold the profession’s values.” 
Likewise, leaders can “provide opportunities for groups…to reflect collectively on 
problems to distinguish those that elicit shared and enduring moral emotions” for possible 
procedural modification.405 
The article expresses a tendency for members to over-prioritize their own patient 
over the group of patients.406 Analogously, SF operators might prioritizing their own 
                                                 
403 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 201. 
404 Ibid., 234. 
405 Ibid., 235. 
406 Ibid., 217. 
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mission or task despite the fact that other missions may be more decisive. A 
comprehensive picture of the operational environment is needed for ODA commanders 
and SOTF synchronizers.  
Accordingly, in the study, one participant noted that he had reminded a surgical 
specialist: “You’re not just a [surgeon] with a knife. You’re a doctor as well.” Hospital 
managers warned that specialists “reduced themselves to little more than technicians” if 
they failed to manage holistic care of patients.407 Likewise, operators must have the 
information, training, judgment, and authority to act in a way that corresponds to both the 
higher mission and in accordance with the SF Ethic. 
Once again, the study emphasizes that, for specialists within a professional 
bureaucracy, leaders must rely on specialists’ judgment. The case mentions an interview 
with a manager who says, “Jill is an expert in cardiac research. If she says, “We should 
be doing this and this,” I’m going to say, “Yeah, go for it...I’m just going to support 
them.”408 Trustworthy individuals are selected and trained within SF and granted the 
autonomy to complete their respective missions. To do otherwise would create a 
misalignment between organizational structure and practice in a way that would be 
deleterious to effectiveness.  
When values conflicts arise, the authors advocate focusing on “the practice, rather 
than the violated or violator…to solving systemic problems.”409 As a hospital manager 
noted, “The best way to arbitrate is [to ask], well what’s the best thing for the patient?”410 
Likewise, SF commanders can ask, “well what’s the best thing for [insert primary value]. 
It is the work of organization leaders (and collective junior leaders) to align values with 
routines rather than simply punishing those who (a) make mistakes while trying to 
navigate misalignment (b) violate routines in favor of values or (c) violate values in favor 
                                                 
407 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 224. 
408 Ibid., 220. 
409 Ibid., 235. 
410 Ibid., 225. 
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of routines. Leaders must keep in mind that certain polices or processes can potentially 
hinder the very values they were created to sustain. 
Lastly, as Wright, Zammuto, and Liesch point out, “Individuals maintain the 
profession’s knowledge base and status by theorizing, educating, and creating new 
routines; policing jurisdictions; deploying rhetorical tactics and narrative acts; and 
reproducing the profession in client interactions.”411 Accordingly, further research is 
needed on what procedures best affect the balance between the SF Ethic and effectiveness 
as well as what methods best institutionalize those norms.  
By using this case study, I make the assumption that important parallels exist 
between the specialists at work in an emergency department and those in the SF 
organization. I apply the more robust research that exists on the former analogously to the 
latter. If the analogy holds, which I think it does, important insights can be made about 
the SF organization that might not otherwise be available—i.e., if we remained cynical 
about the transferability of insights between professions, for example if one was to assert 
that the Mintzberg organizational structures differ, so the lessons do not apply. In sum, 
risk to mission and men probably elicits the most acute moral emotions and the 
corresponding institutional work to align practices with the SF Ethic. However, an 
empirical study of this assertion is warranted. 
 
 
                                                 
411 Wright et al., “Maintaining the Values of a Profession,” 204. 
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